Designing Subnational Institutions

Abstract

This article conceptualizes decentralization as a change in the institutional rules that divide political authority and governing capacity between levels of government. By emphasizing the institutional dimension, the author argues that different approaches to the study of institutions, namely, rational and historical institutionalism, can generate analytical leverage on the contemporary trend of decentralization. In the Chilean case, rationalist perspectives illuminate the country’s continued status as one of Latin America’s most centralized polities. Comparatively weak subnational institutions directly reflect the strategic design considerations of national politicians. However, concepts central to historical institutionalism, including critical junctures and unanticipated consequences, explain how and why decentralization gained steam in the postauthoritarian period. Specifically, Chile’s shift to more decentralized institutions is the legacy of Pinochet-era reforms of subnational government, sequencing patterns that devolved governing capacity before political authority, and the emergence of new organizational actors who have struggled to decentralize Chile against the opposition of powerful national politicians.

Do Fiscal Transfers Affect Local Democracy? Lessons from Chilean Municipalities

“…Chile is a centralized democracy that has gradually transferred important spending responsibilities to municipal governments (Eaton 2004). The country has a three-tiered administrative structure that comprises the national level, 16 regions, and 345 municipalities.…”

“…As for municipal responsibilities, several decentralization reforms over the last decades have increased municipal governments’ attributes and resources, which has turned mayors into important political figures (Eaton 2004). Chilean municipalities have both exclusive and shared responsibilities with other government levels.…”

“…Second, this grant is a large equalization transfer aimed at financing most municipalities and reducing intermunicipal fiscal disparities by transferring income from better-off to less-well-off municipalities (Eaton 2004; OECD 2017). Therefore the transfer is highly redistributive and is the main source of income for most municipalities, turning the vast majority of subnational governments into rentier units.…”

Special Economic Zone at the Crossroads: The Case of Batam

“…This paper adopts the historical institutionalism approach from the comparative political science (Eaton, 2004;Slater & Simmons, 2010). By using the mix method, the paper examines the impact of decentralization on Batam's development trajectories with its dual administrator of Batam, BIFZA and local government, that controls SEZ and urban development, respectively.…”

Nudos críticos del sistema escolar chileno, hipótesis explicativas y propuestas para una nueva arquitectura del sector público

“…El proceso de reforma educativa impulsado posdemocracia, desde mediados de la década de los 90', sufrió una creciente pérdida de confianza de sus conductores, a tenor de que los resultados educativos no alcanzaban lo esperado, sumado críticas al respecto. El Ministerio de Educación reforzó su centralismo decisional en la década del 2000, sin que desde ese momento hasta la fecha se hayan realizado intentos relevantes de descentralización en el ámbito público de la educación, ni siquiera se haya reforzado la naciente institucionalidad de los Gobiernos Regionales con tareas más relevantes, ni haya habido disputas en este campo entre el poder central y el subcentral, dado que el aparato político del Estado chileno y sus cuadros directivos -salvo algunas excepciones-son efectivamente centralistas, incluso en el nivel subcentral, (MARDONES, 2006;EATON, 2004EATON, , 2012.…”