Descartes, Mechanics, and the Mechanical Philosophy

Garber, Daniel

doi:10.1111/1475-4975.261061

Cited by 34 publications

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“…tive soul or other principle of movement and life, apart from its blood and its spirits… (1662/1998, 202) The resources of Cartesian physics -or, perhaps more properly, mechanics -are in principle sufficient to explain the whole of the natural world. 8 As Garber (2002) notes, the radical insight here is that there is no fundamental difference between the behavior of artificial and natural phenomena, and thus no difference in the explanations that such behaviors require. For Descartes, the only difference between artificial and natural phenomena concerns the size of the mechanisms at work.…”

Section: Old Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 97%

Seventeenth-Century Mechanism: An Alternative Framework for Reductionism

Theurer¹

2013

Philos. of Sci.

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ABSTRACT:The consensus view in philosophy of science is that reductionism is dead. One reason for this is that the deductive nomological (DN) model of explanation, on which classical reductionism depends, is widely regarded as indefensible. I argue that the DN model is inessential to the reductionist framework, and that mechanism provides a better framework for thinking about reductionism. But this runs counter to the contemporary mechanists' claim that their view provides a distinct alternative to reductionism. I demonstrate that this view is mistaken. Mechanists are committed to reductionism, as evidenced by the historical roots of the contemporary mechanist program: namely, in the mechanical philosophy of Descartes, Boyle, and others. This view shares certain core commitments with classical and contemporary reductionists. I argue that it is these shared commitments, not a direct commitment to the DN model, that constitute the essential elements of the reductionist program.2

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Section: Old Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 97%

Seventeenth-Century Mechanism: An Alternative Framework for Reductionism

Theurer¹

2013

Philos. of Sci.

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“…René Descartes and Pierre Gassendi proposed new models of the universe that have been labeled "mechanical." Descartes explicitly rejected the idea of intrinsic natures, choosing to explain everything in terms of particles and external laws (Garber 2002). Meanwhile, Gassendi rejected real qualities and substantial forms (scholastic categories for understanding Aristotle) in favor of colliding bodies in space (Osler 2010).…”

Section: Historical Definitions Of Lifementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Aristotelian natural philosophy relied upon natures (physis) as first principles. Aristotelian mechanics (at least as conceived by the scholastics) could be reduced to the action of universal laws on simple matter (Garber 2002). Boyle states it succinctly: "the phenomena of the world are physically produced by the mechanical properties of the parts of matter; and that they operate upon one another by mechanical laws" (quoted in Mayr 1982, 313).…”

Section: Historical Definitions Of Lifementioning

confidence: 99%

Proper activity, preference, and the meaning of life

Mix¹

2014

Philosophy and Theory in Biology

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Both popular and scientific definitions of life must account for the possibility of the suboptimal operation of some function. Identifying the function in question and the criteria for optimality will be necessary steps in crafting a definition that is both intuitive and rigorous. I lay out a rule of thumb-the proper activity criterion-and a three-part typology of binary, range, and preference for understanding definitions of life. The resolution of "optimal" function within a scientific framework presents the central challenge to creating a successful definition of life. A brief history of definitions of life and explanations of biological function is presented to demonstrate the value of the typology. After analyzing three controversial cases-viruses, mules, and stars-I present three possible options for resolution: vitalism, reductionism, and instrumentalism. Only by confronting the consequences of each can we come to consensus about what is necessary and desirable from a common definition. IntroductionThe primary challenge for generating a useful scientific definition of life comes from competing concepts of biological activity and our failure to make them explicit in our models. I set forth a three-part scheme for characterizing definitions of life, identifying a binary (presence or absence of some activity), a range (of operations for the activity), and a preference (for one end of the range). The three components together form a proper activity in biology (Table 1). To be clear, I am not proposing that proper activity be adopted as the best definition of life or even as a desirable definition for life. Instead, I am arguing that some notion of proper activity already exists within common scientific definitions. By making the implicit elements explicit, the notion can be analyzed to see whether it is useful and appropriate in the context of the biological sciences.The preference component has proved problematic historically. Prior to 1600, majority opinion was vitalist, holding that living things were ontologically different from the rest of the universe and governed by intrinsic, life-specific properties. Preference arose from internal sources, such as the soul. Over the next few centuries, modern science adopted mechanical explanations in place of vitalist explanations, replacing intrinsic properties with extrinsic universal forces acting on particles. A mechanical biology, however, was not embraced until the early 20th century, in part due to the apparent purposefulness of living things. I trace the Philos Theor Biol (2014) 6:e501 OPEN ACCESS -Freely Available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org MIX -PROPER ACTIVITY AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 2 OPEN ACCESS -Freely Available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org history of metabolic and evolutionary definitions of life over the last century as they attempt to make proper activities consistent with mechanism. I also look at attempts in the late 20th century to explain the concept of function by appeals to a proper activity. With this groundwork in place, I ad...

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“… Groshozl seems to get close but ultimately, she too, considers the method/ universal mathesis in the Regulae to be merely an algebraic method. For discussions about the nature and continuity of Descartes’ method and the mathesis universalis , see V. Alexandrescu ; L. J. Beck ; P. Dear ; Flage and Bonnen ; D. Garber , : 113–130; D. Garber : 185–204; Machamer and McGuire ; C. Sasaki ; J. Shuster ; Smith ; and Smith . …”

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confidence: 99%

“… For discussions and debates about the nature and continuity of Descartes’ method, see Alexandrescu ; Beck ; Dear ; Flage and Bonnen ; Garber , , ; Machamer and McGuire ; Sasaki ; Shuster ; Smith, N. D. ; and Smith, K. . …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Re‐Examining Descartes’ Algebra and Geometry: An Account Based on theReguale

Liu

2017

Philosophical Books

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Descartes, Mechanics, and the Mechanical Philosophy

Cited by 34 publications

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Seventeenth-Century Mechanism: An Alternative Framework for Reductionism

Seventeenth-Century Mechanism: An Alternative Framework for Reductionism

Proper activity, preference, and the meaning of life

Re‐Examining Descartes’ Algebra and Geometry: An Account Based on theReguale

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