Des Forces nouvelles aux Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire

Abstract

L’organisation d’une élection présidentielle n’a pas produit de dénouement paci?que de la crise militaro-politique ivoirienne. En lieu et place, on a assisté à une violente crise post-électorale, dont l’un des protagonistes principaux est l’ancienne rébellion de 2002, transformée pour l’occasion en Forces républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI). L’analyse du parcours menant des Forces nouvelles aux FRCI révèle à la fois les mutations de l’armée rebelle et les changements qu’elle a impulsés dans le jeu politique. Les contingences politiques de cette crise favorisent l’intégration of?cielle d’un groupe hétéroclite de combattants à l’appareil sécuritaire d’État. Aujourd’hui, le pouvoir d’Alassane Ouattara doit ainsi faire face au dé? de la reconstruction d’une armée véritablement républicaine.

War and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line

“…This alliance solved the problem of external military intervention, creating the condition for an Ivorian solution to the crisis and giving Ouattara the military forces he needed to confront Gbagbo. 58 Yet, it is rather unlikely that this alliance would have been possible without the transformation of the conditions of possibility for legitimate violence that came out of the formation of an 'international' consensus and associated shifts of agency. With the diplomatic and international situation rapidly turning in his favour, Ouattara was able to transform the FN into (arguably) the legitimate military force needed to support his political claims.…”

Mande hunters and the state: cooperation and contestation in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire

“…The first post-conflict government under the northern Alassane Ouattara publicly acknowledged the contribution of dozo brotherhoods during the violent crisis. 13 Whereas his predecessor had refused to step aside after electoral defeat, the new president only managed to take office because of a joint military intervention (Fofana 2011; Straus 2011). 14 This created a kind of indebtedness on the part of the government toward its armed supporters, including many dozo groups.…”

A Phone without Names

“…Given the stalemate, the country experienced another wave of violence. On 28 March 2011, so-called pro-Ouattara forces, composed of the former rebel forces and parts of the regular army, launched an attack in Abidjan with international help that ended in Gbagbo's arrest only two weeks later (Fofana 2011;Piccolino 2012). During that time, neighborhoods of Abidjan experienced politically motivated violence mixed with acts of personal revenge.…”