Depoliticized and Repoliticized Minerals in Latin America

Abstract

Control over mineral wealth has become a highly politicized issue in Latin America, and the region-wide leftwards political shift of the 2000s has profoundly changed mineral policies. After the neoliberal development model of free markets, the state has recently taken a center stage position again, at least with regard to oil, gas, and metallic minerals. This article studies the nature and implications of the shift from neoliberal to post-neoliberal mineral policies in Latin America, using a political economy angle. It analyzes the policies and politics of neoliberal regimes in the 1980s and 1990s, the subsequent booming markets and rising Chinese infl uences, and the new mineral policies of some Leftist governments. Finally, it discusses political confl icts related to these new policies.

South America's biophysical involvement in international trade: the physical trade balances of Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil in the light of ecologically unequal exchange

“…A shift in power to leftist parties took place in many countries. Recent studies (Hogenboom 2012;Veltmeyer 2013) suggest that despite political change, the structures of the extractive economy were not abandoned -indeed, quite the contrary. Newly elected leftists, like Morales in Bolivia, Correa in Ecuador or Lula da Silva in Brazil, aimed to reduce poverty in their countries, but in doing so they relied mainly on exports of natural resources, leading to the emergence of the term 'new extractivism.'…”

Disputes over land and water rights in gold mining: the case of Cerro de San Pedro, Mexico

“…Environmental degradation, illegal land acquisition, water contamination, corruption, violence, resistance and conflict are often associated with mining development (Hogenboom, 2012;van der Sandt, 2009;Wilder & Romero-Lankao, 2006). Campesino (peasant) and indigenous communities are affected by mining activity in the area, and the livelihood strategies of mineadjacent communities are often endangered through decreased access to and control over the land (Peace Brigades Internacionales, 2011;van der Sandt, 2009).…”

“…In the 1980s Mexico faced a severe economic crisis, and the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank demanded that Mexico adopt neoliberal policies if the country wanted to obtain international credit, similar to many other Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Achterhuis, Boelens, & Zwarteveen, 2010;Hogenboom, 1998Hogenboom, , 2012Wilder, 2010). The main focus of the restructuring of the economy was on opening the Mexican market to foreign investment.…”

“…In the design phase, this mechanism was meant as a defensive measure to protect foreign companies against arbitrary and unreasonable government actions. However, it has had several deeply problematic side effects (Hogenboom, 1998(Hogenboom, , 2012Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006, 2007. For example, first, it allows foreign companies to operate in the host country, but in case of a dispute they can go directly to the international arbitration process and entirely bypass domestic courts.…”

“…The option of appealing to the international court under NAFTA is only available to companies operating under NAFTA, and not, for example, to communities or other non-business stakeholders who fear injustice, unequal competition, or socio-environmental costs (Herman, 2010;Nogales, 2002). On more than one occasion, multinational companies have used the possibility of suing governments for noncompliance with agreements made in NAFTA to prevail against environmental restrictions (Hogenboom, 1998(Hogenboom, , 2012Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006, 2007. For example, near Cerro de San Pedro, in 2001, the American corporation Metalclad was awarded $16.5 million dollars by the NAFTA committee after the state of San Luis Potosí refused the installation of a hazardous waste transfer station.…”