1991
DOI: 10.1007/bf00850139
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Denial and minimization among sex offenders

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Cited by 36 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…Typically, cognitive distortions are conceived of as non-normative belief structures that include justifications and rationalisations for sexual offending, and are regarded as a dynamic risk factor (Gannon, Ward, & Collie, 2007). However, Ó Ciardha and Gannon (2011) noted that "cognitive distortions" has been applied to a multitude of different constructs including "maladaptive beliefs" (Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 1997), "defensiveness" (Rogers & Dickey, 1991), "rationalisations" (Neidigh & Krop, 1992), "incorrect or deviant cognitive practices" (Ward & Casey, 2010), and "etiological cognitions" (Ó Ciardha & Gannon, 2011). Although definitions may play a larger role in the conceptualisation of scientific phenomena than perhaps they should (Haig, 2012), the degree of variation in how 'cognitive distortions' are defined poses a significant problem for developing valid measures of dynamic risk.…”
Section: Theory and Application Of Dynamic Risk -5mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Typically, cognitive distortions are conceived of as non-normative belief structures that include justifications and rationalisations for sexual offending, and are regarded as a dynamic risk factor (Gannon, Ward, & Collie, 2007). However, Ó Ciardha and Gannon (2011) noted that "cognitive distortions" has been applied to a multitude of different constructs including "maladaptive beliefs" (Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 1997), "defensiveness" (Rogers & Dickey, 1991), "rationalisations" (Neidigh & Krop, 1992), "incorrect or deviant cognitive practices" (Ward & Casey, 2010), and "etiological cognitions" (Ó Ciardha & Gannon, 2011). Although definitions may play a larger role in the conceptualisation of scientific phenomena than perhaps they should (Haig, 2012), the degree of variation in how 'cognitive distortions' are defined poses a significant problem for developing valid measures of dynamic risk.…”
Section: Theory and Application Of Dynamic Risk -5mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since then cognitive phenomena have been "hooked on" to the term by successive authors so that cognitive distortions can now be said to include belief systems (Abel, et al, 1984), justifications, perceptions, judgments (Abel, Gore, Holland, & Camp, 1989), excuses (Pollock & Hashmall, 1991) defensiveness (Rogers & Dickey, 1991) rationalizations (Neidigh & Krop, 1992), and denials or minimizations (Bumby, 1996). Readers of the cognitive distortion literature can find themselves in the position, whereby they are unsure of which of these constructs is being referred to by a given author.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…À partir des travaux de Rogers [21], Rogers et Dickey [22] proposent un modè le mettant l'accent sur l'aspect adaptatif et situationnel du dé ni. Cette straté gie se retrouverait chez des personnes se sentant en situation de danger, qui pensent qu'elles ont plus à perdre à avouer qu'à dé nier, et que le dé ni est la straté gie la plus adapté e. Dans ce modè le, plus l'environnement est hostile, plus le dé ni sera important.…”
Section: Dynamique Sous-jacente : Une Approche Interpersonnelle Du Déunclassified
“…Le modè le de Rogers et Dickey [22] est trè s proche du modè le de la ré sistance en thé rapie de Miller et Rollnick [17]. Pour ces auteurs, la ré sistance, ici le dé ni, est conçue comme le signal d'une dissonance dans la relation patient/thé rapeute.…”
Section: Dynamique Sous-jacente : Une Approche Interpersonnelle Du Déunclassified