Demonstrating that monitoring and punishing increase non-cooperative behavior in a social dilemma game

Kitakaji, Yoko; Ohnuma, Susumu

doi:10.4992/jjpsy.85.9

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(10 reference statements)

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“…The Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game was developed by incorporating the Japanese industrial waste disposal structure as a social dilemma (Ohnuma & Kitakaji, 2007). Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2014) verified whether sanctions may cause noncooperation, and revealed that the presence of surveillance and punishment triggered illegal dumping behavior and prevent the sharing of information essential for mutual cooperation. One possible reason for the increase in non-cooperation was that the presence of the sanction shifted the focus of communication to non-cooperation, discouraging the expectation of cooperation.…”

Section: Illegal Dumping As a Social Dilemma And The Effects Of Sanctmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…These motivational factors and the social structure designed in the game prevented the expectation of mutual cooperation from taking shape. Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2014) examined the effect of surveillance and punishment but did not consider the effect of rewards. Rewards may induce cooperation different from surveillance and punishment.…”

Section: Illegal Dumping As a Social Dilemma And The Effects Of Sanctmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also expand upon the effects of monitoring and punishing. Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2014) examined the effects of monitoring and punishment by a specific surveillant. There is a possibility that such asymmetry creates a difference between what requires monitoring and what is actually monitored, or what results in punishment and what is punished.…”

Section: Illegal Dumping As a Social Dilemma And The Effects Of Sanctmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2014) examined the effect of surveillance and punishment but did not consider the effect of rewards. Rewards may induce cooperation different from surveillance and punishment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Detrimental Effects of Punishment and Reward on Cooperation in the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game

Kitakaji

Ohnuma

2019

Simulation & Gaming

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Background. Many studies have shown that sanctions promote cooperation in social dilemma situations. However, it has also been suggested that sanctions have a negative effect. The interactions among people and systems need to be considered to examine the consequences of sanctions. Aim. We examined whether rewards and mutual punishment increased non-cooperation. We regarded illegal industrial waste dumping as a social dilemma in which everyone bears the burden of the cost of illegal dumping, legal treatment is cooperative behavior, and illegal dumping is non-cooperative behavior. Method. We used the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game. This game simulates the structure of industrial waste treatment (incomplete surveillance, various industries with different roles and payoffs, cost of cooperation, etc.) in addition to the social dilemma structure. Players take on roles in industrial waste treatment, negotiating and dealing with other players, and treating industrial waste. We set three conditions. In the reward condition, players can earn rewards by rapidly treating industrial waste. In the mutual punishment condition, players can mutually monitor and punish each other. In the control condition, neither reward nor punishment exists. Results. Non-cooperation occurred more frequently in the reward condition than in the control condition. Conversely, there was no difference in non-cooperation between the mutual punishment and control conditions. Players under the reward condition did not gather information proactively, and information on benefits was not shared. Conclusion. This study showed that sanctions caused non-cooperation. Social dynamics should be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions. Gaming allows us to examine social consequences, including social dynamics, which leads to discoveries not possible through traditional methods.

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Section: Illegal Dumping As a Social Dilemma And The Effects Of Sanctmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Illegal Dumping As a Social Dilemma And The Effects Of Sanctmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Illegal Dumping As a Social Dilemma And The Effects Of Sanctmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Detrimental Effects of Punishment and Reward on Cooperation in the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game

Kitakaji

Ohnuma

2019

Simulation & Gaming

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Even Unreliable Information Disclosure Makes People Cooperate in a Social Dilemma: Development of the “Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game”

Kitakaji

Ohnuma

2016

Translational Systems Sciences

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This study explores whether information disclosure can cause cooperation in a social dilemma, even when people can disseminate false information. In the past, illegal dumping increased in Japan despite the strengthening of penalties and surveillance laws, due to practical limitations in monitoring and surveillance. To resolve this, the tracking sheet used to trace the trading and processing of the wastes must be traceable in order to detect illegal dumping. This means that manifests must be written precisely in order to be effective but if maintaining a tracking log has some function other than surveillance this may not be the case. To examine this issue we used the "Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping game" (Ohnuma & Kitakaji, 2007) which simulates the disposal of industrial waste and is structured as a social dilemma with asymmetry of information. In this study we utilised two conditions: a disclosure and a control condition. Under the disclosure condition, players had to enter the amount of commission or disposal in the landfill but did not have to fill in the correct amount. Although players could read the report, they could not know who performed illegal dumping or how much they contributed. Therefore, this disclosure did not have an effective surveillance function and could not help detect non-cooperation. However, the results showed that the amount of illegal dumping was reduced, and information on payoffs was shared more in the disclosure condition than in the control condition. Moreover, players collected and shared their information more in the disclosure condition than in the control condition. The study thus indicates that the function of disclosure is not surveillance, but information sharing which is essential for voluntary cooperation.

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Consensus Building: Process Design Toward Finding a Shared Recognition of Common Goal Beyond Conflicts

Ohnuma¹

2020

Handbook of Systems Sciences

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Demonstrating that monitoring and punishing increase non-cooperative behavior in a social dilemma game

Cited by 7 publications

References 18 publications

The Detrimental Effects of Punishment and Reward on Cooperation in the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game

The Detrimental Effects of Punishment and Reward on Cooperation in the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game

Even Unreliable Information Disclosure Makes People Cooperate in a Social Dilemma: Development of the “Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game”

Consensus Building: Process Design Toward Finding a Shared Recognition of Common Goal Beyond Conflicts

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