Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory

Abstract

How do nation-states' political institutions affect the relations between states? This article addresses that question by testing the predictions of different theories linking political institutions to war outcomes. Specifically, rent-seeking and regime legitimacy theories predict that all democratic belligerents are more likely to win wars because they fight more effectively. Alternatively, other theories focusing on the domestic political vulnerability of leaders and the marketplace of ideas predict that democracies are likely to be more careful about choosing when to start war. This would mean that only democratic initiators are more likely to win. Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1982 with a multivariate probit model, we find that democratic initiators are significantly more likely to win wars; democratic targets are also more likely to win, though the relationship is not as strong. We also find empirical support for several control variables, including strategy, terrain, and capability.

Democracy and armed conflict

“…This makes democracies unattractive targets, since they are likely to win the wars they fight (Reiter & Stam, 1998). 15 Both of these tendencies tend to reduce the probability of war between democracies.…”

A winning proposition? States’ military effectiveness and the reliability of their allies

“…2 Reed (1997) confirms these findings in a study that extends the time period of Gaubatz's study and employs a different statistical model, discrete-time event history analysis. 3 Because of the nature of their study, Reiter and Stam (1998) do not include wars that ended as draws in their data set. To remedy this, I create a composite data set using Reiter and Stam's coding as the master set and incorporating the draws included in Bennett and Stam (1998).…”

“…To remedy this, I create a composite data set using Reiter and Stam's coding as the master set and incorporating the draws included in Bennett and Stam (1998). Where other differences appear between Reiter andStam's (1998) coding andBennett and coding, I rely on the former. This includes any differences in combatant lists, win/lose/draw codings, the inclusion or exclusion of non-draw cases and so on.…”

Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of international conflict

“…Even this seems to be an empirical regularity (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Reiter and Stam, 1998).…”

“…The analysis rests on two assumptions which do not seem to hold up to empirical scrutiny. First, it is assumed that democratic leaders would rather capitulate outright than fight a war on their home soil (Reiter and Stam, 1998). Second, the fear of exploitation leads democracies to launch preemptive strikes against autocratic enemies (Reiter, 1995).…”