Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of international conflict

Tangerås, Thomas

doi:10.1007/s10101-008-0055-6

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 32 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These days, many scholars believe that despite the much-debated notion that liberal democracies have a more peaceful disposition overall, democratic dyads tend to resolve conflicts peacefully, and thus the possibility of conflict in a group of two or more democratic states is minimized [17]. This view is backed by the notion that democratic leaders tend to be more selective about waging war and demonstrate more sensitivity to the cost of warfare, which creates a relationship between regime type and behavior of state [18][19][20]. There are also opposing ideas to the modern dyadic version of democratic peace.…”

Section: Review Of the Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The "Double Standard" of Nonproliferation: Regime Type and the U.S. Response to Nuclear Weapons Program

Shymanska¹

2018

IJNS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is no doubt that the NPT regime is far from being equal for all states involved. As the predominant hegemonic power since WWII, the United States plays a major role in deciding the fates of non-great power proliferators. This article tries to find the logical explanation of the phenomenon whereby some nuclear proliferators are absolved regardless of their active accumulation of nuclear arsenals while others are labeled as "rogue states" and ordered to disarm. The article suggests that a particular proliferator's political regime could affect the way in which its state is approached by the U.S., known for its loyalty to democratic values. To check this argument's feasibility, the author analyzes and compares types of political regimes of proliferators-which refer to non-great powers that commenced their nuclear programs since 1964. The study also shows that alignment with the U.S. and presence or absence of hostility toward the West are also influential factors. Along with the proliferator's political regime, these factors determine whether the country is necessarily absolved, required to disarm, or heavily punished. The author finds that the U.S. tends to free democratic proliferators from charges, especially those aligned with the U.S., officially or unofficially. In most cases, the autocratic governments are coerced to give up their proliferation ambitions, though an alignment with the U.S. may work as an extenuating circumstance to render the punishment less harmful. The article aims to demonstrate that the U.S.'s tendency to coerce undemocratic de facto nuclear powers, while avoiding coercion against democratic partners, is not a mere "double standard" or bias, but rather, a part of the U.S.'s strategic policy.

show abstract

Section: Review Of the Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The "Double Standard" of Nonproliferation: Regime Type and the U.S. Response to Nuclear Weapons Program

Shymanska¹

2018

IJNS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A complementary explanation relies on asymmetric information. [Recent analyses taking this approach while focusing on the democratic peace hypothesis include Levy and Razin (2004) and Tangerås (2009)]. Fearon (2008), in his analysis of "colonial" democracies (defined as those democracies not committed to extending the rights and privileges enjoyed by their citizens to the inhabitants of conquered territories) combines both approaches.…”

Section: Possible Outcomes In the Second Periodmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Institutions and War Initiation: The Democratic Peace Hypothesis Revisited

Garfinkel

2012

Oxford Handbooks Online

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. This chapter analyzes the influence of democratic institutions-specifically, the effects of (i) electoral uncertainty when individuals within a nation have different preferences over public peaceful investment and (ii) greater checks and balances that lead to a more effective mobilization of resources for both public peaceful investment and arming-on a nation's incentive to arm and willingness to initiate war. The analysis is based on a model where nations contest some given resource and where they cannot commit to their future allocations to arming; yet, the victor in a conflict today gains an advantage in future conflict and thus realizes a savings in future arming. These assumptions imply that, despite the short-term incentives to settle peacefully, one or both nations might choose to initiate war. In such a setting, electoral uncertainty tends to make a democracy more peaceful relative to an autocracy, whereas greater checks and balances tend to make a democracy less peaceful. Thus, while two democracies might be more peaceful than two autocracies when paired against each other in a contest over a given resource, this is not necessarily the case. Even under conditions where democracies are most likely to be peaceful with one another, democracies are at least as likely to be in war with autocracies as autocracies are likely to be in war each other.JEL Classification: D30, D70, D72, D74, D78, F51.

show abstract

“…Other theories of the Kantian peace based on incomplete information are provided by Levy and Razin[22] and Tangeras[29].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Hobbesian Trap

Baliga¹,

Sjöström²

2012

Oxford Handbooks Online

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of international conflict

Cited by 11 publications

References 32 publications

The "Double Standard" of Nonproliferation: Regime Type and the U.S. Response to Nuclear Weapons Program

The "Double Standard" of Nonproliferation: Regime Type and the U.S. Response to Nuclear Weapons Program

Political Institutions and War Initiation: The Democratic Peace Hypothesis Revisited

The Hobbesian Trap

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About