Democracy Defended

Mackie, Gerry

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490293

Cited by 220 publications

(109 citation statements)

References 204 publications

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“…A democracia representativa, após ter alguns de seus pressupostos desafiados pela crítica da teoria da escolha social (Riker, 1982;Mackie, 2003), viu-se confrontada pelos modelos participativos (Pateman, 1970;Mansbridge, 1980;Barber, 1984;Fung, 2004;Avritzer 2002) e deliberativos (Cohen, 1989;Fishkin, 1991;Habermas, 1995;Gutmann, 1996;Bohman, 1996;Dryzek, 2000), o que tornou imperativa a necessidade de que fosse conceitualmente repensada a fim de converter seus supostos vícios em fontes renovadas de virtude e fazer de suas eventuais fraquezas a fonte de renovação de suas forças.…”

Section: A Dimensão Epistemológica: Reflexividadeunclassified

Democracia pragmática: pressupostos de uma teoria normativa empiricamente orientada

Pogrebinschi

2010

Dados

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A cisão existente na ciência política entre, de um lado, os que trabalham com teoria e, de outro, aqueles que se dedicam aos estudos empíricos sobre as instituições é um fato que se tornou notório desde a institucionalização da disciplina, em particular no Brasil (Amorim Neto e Santos, 2005). O alijamento entre as abordagens conceituais da política e as análises empíricas de suas instituições impõe indubitáveis limites ao desenvolvimento interno de cada uma destas subdivisões disciplinares e, sobretudo, implica a ausência de uma cooperação essencial à solução dos dilemas políticos e dos impasses sociais do mundo contemporâneo. No caso específico da teoria política, a ausência de diálogo com a empiria parece ser ainda mais nociva, pois, a despeito do inegável valor intrínseco do tratamento filosófico e histórico da política, uma significativa parcela das teorizações recentes parece estar cada vez mais apartada da experiência -única instância que permitiria validá-las, aplicá-las e refleti-las na realidade concreta, de modo a não permitir que sejam reduzidas unicamente ao seu valor heurístico.As causas do divórcio entre a teoria política contemporânea e os estudos empíricos sobre as instituições políticas não podem ser reduzidas 657 * Agradeço ao parecerista anônimo de DADOS pelos valiosos comentários e construtivas críticas que me forçaram a uma longa reflexão sobre este texto e um ainda mais longo processo de reescrita que culminou em importantes reformulações nesta versão final. Agradeço também a Leonardo Avritzer pelo fundamental incentivo para que eu publicasse este artigo e, mais importante, não deixasse de acreditar nas ideias nele expressas.

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Section: A Dimensão Epistemológica: Reflexividadeunclassified

Democracia pragmática: pressupostos de uma teoria normativa empiricamente orientada

Pogrebinschi

2010

Dados

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“…As Arrow and his followers have shown, in these circumstances any social ordering of individual preferences, not least majority rule, is likely to be arbitrary. Yet, though logically possible, cycles and the resulting problems of instability, incoherence or manipulation turn out to be rare (Mackie, 2003). The range of options considered by both the electorate and legislatures is considerably fewer than the multifarious rankings people might offer of the total range of policy issues.…”

Section: The Democratic Constitutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Democratic Constitution: Why Europeans should Avoid American Style Constitutional Judicial Review

Bellamy

2008

Eur Polit Sci

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Understanding of the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy among legal and political philosophers reflects an idealised account of the US constitution and the nature of judicial review. This view is normatively and empirically flawed. The US constitution is built on pre-democratic assumptions and its countermajoritarian checks and balances are largely regressive, benefiting privileged minorities over the underprivileged. By contrast, 'actually existing democracy', involving competing parties and majority rule, is constitutional in its process and effects, treating all with equal concern and respect, upholding rights and maintaining the rule of law.Judicial review undermines these beneficial qualities.Key words Democracy, constitutions, judicial review, rights 2 Running head: The democratic constitution Does democracy need a constitution? The increasingly dominant view is that it does.Constitutions are said to enshrine and secure the rights central to a democratic society.According to this account, a constitution is a written document, superior to ordinary legislation and entrenched against legislative change, justiciable and constitutive of the legal and political system (Raz, 1998: 153-4). It is the constitution, not participation in democratic politics per se, that offers the basis for citizens to be treated in a democratic way as deserving of equal concern and respect (Dworkin, 1996: 24, 32-35). The electorate and politicians may engage in a democratic process, but they do not always embrace democratic values. The defence of these belongs to the constitution and its judicial guardians. This view has been neatly summarised by Cherie Booth, speaking as a distinguished QC rather than the wife of Tony Blair. As she puts it:'In a human rights world … responsibility for a value-based substantive commitment to democracy rests in large part on judges … [J]udges in constitutional democracies are set aside as the guardians of individual rights … [and] afforded the opportunity and duty to do justice for all citizens by reliance on universal standards of decency and humaneness … in a way that teaches citizens and government about the ethical responsibilities of being participants in a true democracy ' (Booth, 2005).

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“…However, the empirical examples identified by Riker and others (cf. Nurmi 1999;Gehrlein 2006;Van Deemen 2014;Kaminski 2015: 371ff) have occasionally been criticized for being anecdotal or empirically weak, etc., and often relying on speculative configurations of preferences (Green and Shapiro 1994;Mackie 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trump, Condorcet and Borda: Voting paradoxes in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries

Kurrild-Klitgaard

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

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Abstract. The organization of US presidential elections make them potentially vulnerable to so-called "voting paradoxes", identified by social choice theorists but rarely documented empirically. The presence of a record high number of candidates in the 2016 Republican Party presidential primaries may have made this possibility particularly latent. Using polling data from the primaries we identify two possible cases: Early in the pre-primary (2015) a cyclical majority may have existed in Republican voters' preferences between Bush, Cruz and Walker-thereby giving a rare example of the Condorcet Paradox. Furthermore, later polling data (March 2016) suggests that while Trump (who achieved less than 50% of the total Republican primary vote) was the Plurality Winner, he could have been beaten in pairwise contests by at least one other candidate-thereby exhibiting a case of the Borda Paradox. The cases confirm the empirical relevance of the theoretical voting paradoxes and the importance of voting procedures.

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Democracy Defended

Cited by 220 publications

References 204 publications

Democracia pragmática: pressupostos de uma teoria normativa empiricamente orientada

Democracia pragmática: pressupostos de uma teoria normativa empiricamente orientada

The Democratic Constitution: Why Europeans should Avoid American Style Constitutional Judicial Review

Trump, Condorcet and Borda: Voting paradoxes in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries

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