Democracy and Arab Political Culture

Kedourie, Eliè

doi:10.4324/9781315037257

Cited by 48 publications

(59 citation statements)

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“…Certainly, Islam has demonstrated in the past that it is not necessarily incompatible with democratic forms of government, in Turkey and Malaysia (Kedourie 1992), Indonesia, Senegal and India (Stepan and Linz 2013) and in Muslim populations in eastern Europe. There is not much evidence to link religiosity as such with opposition to political change (Tessler 2002), and Arab Islamic parties managed to come forward and work together within a democratic framework in both Egypt and Tunisia after the Uprisings.…”

Section: Authoritarian Resilience and Cultural Closurementioning

confidence: 99%

The tide that failed to rise: Young people’s politics and social values in and after the Arab uprisings

Abbott

Teti

Sapsford

2018

Mediterranean Politics

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The story of the 'Arab Spring' as a revolt of young people against autocracy does not stand up to survey analysis at country level. Data from the Arab Transformations Survey show that young people were over-represented as participants, but it is necessary to stretch the concept of 'youth' into middle age in some countries to say this, there were plenty of older participants, and the protests were aimed less at political rights and more at social justice. Fundamental political changes have been expected in MENA which would sweep away autocratic rule in favour of democratisation, as the values successive younger generations became individualised, liberalised and secularised under the influence of economic and market development and the spread of education, but there is very little evidence that this is what occurred in the Arab Uprisings. Whether young or older, protestors were looking for regime change, an end to corruption and a reduction in IMF-inspired austerity, but political freedoms and democratic governance do not appear to have been at the top of their agenda.

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Section: Authoritarian Resilience and Cultural Closurementioning

confidence: 99%

The tide that failed to rise: Young people’s politics and social values in and after the Arab uprisings

Abbott

Teti

Sapsford

2018

Mediterranean Politics

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“…do not permit me to go into a review of this literature here.1 I would simply like to refer to two factors that seem to be of primary importance in explaining the persistence of what has been termed the Arab democracy deficit, at least until 1 The following references are but a very small sample of writings starting with the early 1980s and representing differing viewpoints on this question: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1983;Sharabi, 1988;Hudson, 1991;Kedourie, 1994;Salameh, 1994;Waterbury, 1994;Al Naqeeb, 1996;Harik, 2006;Bichara, 2006;Noland, 2008;Diamond, 2010;Amin et al, 2012;Chaney, 2012;Haseeb, 2013;Elbadawi and Makdisi., 2011;Aldashev et al, 2013. Source: eiu Reports, 2011 and 2014.…”

Section: Libyamentioning

confidence: 99%

Reflections on the Arab Uprisings

Makdisi

2017

Combining Economic and Political Development

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This chapter offers reflections on the Arab uprisings grouped under four headings: (1) the entrenchment of autocracy in the region, (2) the unravelling of autocracy, (3) the uncertainty of the transition process, and (4) the challenges of sustaining democratic transitions. Among the primary factors underlying the general entrenchment of Arab autocracy, at least prior to the uprisings, are the relative abundance of oil resources and the region's multi-faceted conflicts, along with all their attendant disruptive foreign interventions. Youth unemployment rising to very high levels and the persistence of deep economic inequality were important factors contributing to the uprisings. They were also reinforced by long frustrated aspirations for greater freedom and political participation on the part of social groups that have felt largely excluded from the benefits of economic development. As of late 2016 the outcome of the uprisings remains highly uncertain especially with the rise to power of strictly fundamentalist groups and the ensuing armed conflicts that have come in their wake. The struggle between forces pushing for a move towards democracy and those pushing for the maintenance and/or regeneration of autocracy is presently in full play. Transition experiences point to two fundamental challenges facing the consolidation of democratic transitions: firstly that the political victors be able to move in the direction of establishing genuinely representative and accountable political institutions. Secondly that they succeed in implementing an inclusive socioeconomic strategy that not only focuses on growth and expanding employment opportunities but also eliminates 'elite capture' of the public sector.

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“…Det er der en raekke grunde til. Det er de faerreste forskere, der direkte har peget på islam som synderen, idet en raekke muslimske lande uden for Mellemøsten har indført demokratiske valg (Stepan & Robertson 2003;Diamond 2010;Gause 2011; se dog Huntington 1991, 298-301;Lewis 1993;Kedourie 1994). I stedet peger mange eksperter på en blanding af lave moderniseringsniveauer, olieafhaengighed og immunitet fra vestligt pres -nogle gange ligefrem vestlig støtte til autokratiske regimer (Diamond 2010).…”

Section: Det Arabiske Forårs Følgevirkningerunclassified

Et (u)forudseeligt Mellemøsten: Samfundsvidenskaben, point predictions og pattern predictions

Møller¹

2012

Politik

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The so-called ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab uprisings’ in 2011 took observers by surprise, thereby reinvigorating the criticism that political scientists are poor at prediction. In this article, it is argued that social science is incapable of predicting such events systematically. e argumentation is based on economist Friedrich Hayek’s distinction between sciences that deals with simple and complex phenomena. e latter category, where the social sciences should be situated, are unable to make ‘point predictions’. What social science can do is to make that which Hayek terms ‘pattern predictions’. Based on established theories within the study of regime change, such pattern predictions are o ered with respect to the longer-term consequences of the Arab uprisings.

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Democracy and Arab Political Culture

Cited by 48 publications

References 0 publications

The tide that failed to rise: Young people’s politics and social values in and after the Arab uprisings

The tide that failed to rise: Young people’s politics and social values in and after the Arab uprisings

Reflections on the Arab Uprisings

Et (u)forudseeligt Mellemøsten: Samfundsvidenskaben, point predictions og pattern predictions

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