Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief

Stone, Tony; Young, Andrew W.

doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00051

Cited by 115 publications

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“…More precisely, the second factor explains either why the delusion is formed and maintained (e.g. Stone and Young; McKay) or only why the delusion is maintained (e.g. Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton).…”

Section: The Development Of Delusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions

Bortolotti

Miyazono

2015

Philosophy Compass

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In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter‐evidence? Do the formation and maintenance of delusions require abnormal experience alone, or also reasoning biases or deficits? We hope to show that the focus on delusions has made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of the mind and continues to raise issues that are central to defining the concept of belief and gaining a better understanding of how people process information and learn about the world.

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Section: The Development Of Delusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions

Bortolotti

Miyazono

2015

Philosophy Compass

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“…Many cognitive scientists accept a two factor account of delusions (Davies et al 2001; Stone and Young 1997). Factor one is typically held to be an abnormal experience, consequent on brain insult or disease.…”

Section: The Hypothesis Testing Brainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Addiction as a disorder of belief

Levy

2014

Biol Philos

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Addiction is almost universally held to be characterized by a loss of control over drug-seeking and consuming behavior. But the actions of addicts, even of those who seem to want to abstain from drugs, seem to be guided by reasons. In this paper, I argue that we can explain this fact, consistent with continuing to maintain that addiction involves a loss of control, by understanding addiction as involving an oscillation between conflicting judgments. I argue that the dysfunction of the mesolimbic dopamine system that typifies addictions causes the generation of a mismatch between the top-down model of the world that reflects the judgment that the addict ought to refrain from drugs, and bottom-up input caused by cues predictive of drug availability. This constitutes a powerful pressure toward revising the judgment and thereby attenuating the prediction error. But the new model is not stable, and shifts under the pressure of bottom-up inputs in different contexts; hence the oscillation of all-things-considered judgment. Evidence from social psychology is adduced, to suggest that a similar process may be involved in ordinary cases of weakness of will.

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“…Typically subjects believe that one of their closest relatives or their spouse has been replaced by an impostor and dismiss overwhelming evidence that the people who look identical to their loved ones are who they say they are. According to a standard account of the formation of the delusion (Stone and Young 1997), the delusion arises when the affective component of the face-processing module is damaged, leaving recognition unimpaired. Subjects see the loved one and recognise their face, but form the belief that the person they are looking at is not really the relative or the spouse.…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentionality Without Rationality

Bortolotti

2005

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)

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It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description.

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Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief

Cited by 115 publications

References 0 publications

Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions

Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions

Addiction as a disorder of belief

Intentionality Without Rationality

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