Deliberating in the presence of manipulation

Abstract

According to deliberation compatibilism, rational deliberation is compatible with the belief that one’s actions are causally determined by factors beyond one’s control. This paper offers a counterexample to recent accounts of rational deliberation that entail deliberation compatibilism. The counterexample involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation. It is further argued that there is no relevant difference between the purported counterexample and ordinary doxastic circumstances in which a determinist deliberates.

On the Compatibility of Rational Deliberation and Determinism: Why Deterministic Manipulation Is Not a Counterexample

“…This paper aims to defend deliberation-compatibilism against several objections, including a recent counterexample by Yishai Cohen (2018) that involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation.…”

“…Let me now turn to a recent objection by Yishai Cohen (2018) Kapitan (1996: 436), Clarke (1992: 103), Dennett (1984: 115), and Nelkin (2011: 142), I focus here only its treatment of Pereboom's formulation. I will grant that if the counterexample succeeds against (EO) and (DE), it succeeds tout court as an argument against 'all recent pro-DC views'.]…”

“…1 The opening of this paper, including the definitions of deliberation-compatibilism and -incompatibilism, mirrors in form and content of the opening of Yishai Cohen's (2018) paper. Deliberation-Compatibilism: S's deliberating and being rational is compatible with S's believing that their actions are causally determined by antecedent conditions beyond their control.…”

Sceptical Deliberations

“…In defining deliberation compatibilism, Pereboom takes as a starting point (2008, p. 288; 2014, p. 106) that it is ‘evident’ that if determinism is true, leeway scepticism is true. And Cohen (2018, p. 87) stipulates that the relevant form of rationality implies having a true belief about the compatibility question between determinism and leeway. As I have argued, these assumptions are mistaken.…”

“…20 20 See Taylor (1966, 181–84), Waller (1985, 48), Nelkin (2004, 215–18), Pereboom (2008, 288–89), Henden (2010, 313), Nielsen (2011, 283–84), and Cohen (2018, 87).…”