On the Compatibility of Rational Deliberation and Determinism: Why Deterministic Manipulation Is Not a Counterexample

Abstract

This paper aims to defend deliberation-compatibilism against several objections, including a recent counterexample by Yishai Cohen that involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation. It begins by offering a Moorean-style proof of deliberation-compatibilism. It then turns to the leading argument for deliberation-incompatibilism, which is based on the presumed incompatibility of causal determinism and the ‘openness’ required for rational deliberation. The paper explains why this argument fails and develops a coherent account of how one can rationally deliberate and believe in causal determinism without inconsistency. The second half of the paper then takes up Cohen's proposed counterexample and his Four-Case Deliberation Argument (FCDA) against deliberation-compatibilism, which is meant to mirror Derk Pereboom's famous Four-Case Manipulation Argument. In response, the author defends a hard-line reply to FCDA but also argues that the notion of ‘sourcehood’ relevant to rational deliberation differs from that involved in free will.

Moral Responsibility Reconsidered

“…The main concern is a practical one: Can we live with the belief that it is true? A number of skeptics argue that we, in fact, can (see, e.g., Pereboom 2001Pereboom , 2014aPereboom , 2021bPereboom , 2022Waller 2011Waller , 2014Caruso 2017Caruso , 2018aCaruso , 2021aCaruso , 2021bPereboom and Caruso 2018). In this section, we address three main classes of practical issues.…”

“…This concern, however, seems misguided. There is no inconsistency in accepting a Kantian regard for respect for persons without accepting Kant's particular attitudes on free will (see Pereboom 2001: 150-52;Vilhauer 2009bVilhauer , 2013aVilhauer , 2013bCaruso 2021a). Benjamin Vilhauer (2009bVilhauer ( , 2013aVilhauer ( , 2013b, for instance, has convincingly argued that there is an important, often overlooked, distinction between action-based desert claims and personhood-based desert claims.…”

“…Strawson may be right to contend that adopting the objective attitude would seriously hinder our personal relationships (for a contrary perspective, see Sommers 2007). However, a case can be made that it would be wrong to claim that this stance would be appropriate if determinism did pose a genuine threat to the reactive attitudes (Pereboom 1995(Pereboom , 2001(Pereboom : 199-203, 2014a(Pereboom : 178-93, 2021bPereboom and Caruso 2018;Caruso 2021a). As we saw in Section 2, given free will skepticism, an expression of resentment or indignation would involve doxastic irrationality when it is accompanied by the belief that the wrongdoer does not basically deserve the pain or harm of being its target.…”