Delegating performance evaluation

Letina, Igor; Liu, Shuo; Netzer, Nick

doi:10.3982/te3570

Cited by 20 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 61 publications

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“…The proposed model is based on a systematic approach to the study of mental phenomena and personality activity, which is well-established in contemporary psychological science [15][16][17]. The system-forming factor in the model of game-technical management of the educational environment is a methodological procedure specially developed by the authors, aimed at determining the search and research games potential to solve the problems of enriching the educational environment of a particular educational institution.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game-Technical Management Of The Educational Environment

et al. 2020

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The article presents the results of theoretical research and practical use of game-technical training technologies to enrich the educational environment in a pedagogical university. The need to organize and conduct present research is due to the objective demand for teachers who can master and implement interactive technologies in the educational process, as well as manage them. The authors’ goal was to develop a theoretical model for enriching the content of education in a contemporary pedagogical university based on game-technical management. The process of achieving the goal is presented in the article in the form of a description of this model, analysis, and interpretation of the results obtained during testing the model proposed for using to enrich the content of education in the educational environment of the university. A system-forming factor in the concept of educational game-technical management is a methodological procedure specially developed by the authors, which aims at determining the potential of search and research games to solve the problems of enriching the educational environment of a particular educational institution. The necessary conditions for the functioning of this process, presented in the article, will help future executives of educational organizations to assess the potential of game-technical management and the possible risks of its practical implementation.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game-Technical Management Of The Educational Environment

et al. 2020

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“…In the complete information all-pay auction model with convex costs, Fang, Noe and Strack (2018) show that this is always the optimal contract. Letina, Liu and Netzer (2018) show that this contract is optimal when a manager has to delegate incentive provision to an intermediate reviewer who cares about workers' well-being. Behaviorally, extreme punishment contracts generate extra effort due to "last-place aversion" (Kuziemko et al, 2014;Dutcher et al, 2015;Gill et al, 2018).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Tournament rewards and heavy tails

Drugov

Ryvkin

2020

Journal of Economic Theory

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Heavy-tailed fluctuations are common in many environments, such as sales of creative and innovative products or the financial sector. We study how the presence of heavy tails in the distribution of shocks affects the optimal allocation of prizes in rank-order tournaments. While a winner-take-all prize schedule maximizes aggregate effort for light-tailed shocks, prize sharing becomes optimal when shocks acquire heavy tails, increasingly so following a skewness order. Extreme prize sharing-rewarding all ranks but the very last-is optimal when shocks have a decreasing failure rate, such as power laws. Hence, under heavy-tailed uncertainty, typically associated with strong inequality in the distribution of gains, providing incentives and reducing inequality go hand in hand.

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“…This interpretation relates our model to the growing literature on behaviorally biased managers/supervisors. See, e.g., Prendergast and Topel (1996), Giebe and Gürtler (2012), and Letina, Liu, and Netzer (2018).…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets

Liu

Migrow

2018

SSRN Journal

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Multinational and multiproduct firms often experience uncertainty in the relative return of conducting activities in different markets due to, for example, exchange rate volatility or the changing prospects of different products. We study how a multi-divisional organization should optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the form of verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the inter-market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage information acquisition, and this negative effect is amplified by the need for coordinating the activities of different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decisionmaking can actually be driven by a large coordination motive.

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Delegating performance evaluation

Cited by 20 publications

References 61 publications

Game-Technical Management Of The Educational Environment

Game-Technical Management Of The Educational Environment

Tournament rewards and heavy tails

Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets

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