Delayed judgments of learning cause both a decrease in absolute accuracy (calibration) and an increase in relative accuracy (resolution)

Overschelde, James P. Van; Nelson, Thomas O.

doi:10.3758/bf03195916

Cited by 25 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Calibration is the average correspondence between JOLs and recall. Following Koriat (1997), we included JOL and recall percentages as two levels of one independent variable designated ''measure" (see also Koriat & Bjork, 2005Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004;Koriat, Ma'ayan, Sheffer, & Bjork, 2006;Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma'ayan, 2002;Van Overschelde & Nelson, 2006). A Trial (1, 2) Â Emotionality (negative, neutral) Â Measure (JOL, recall) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant 3-way interaction, F(1, 46) = 8.65, MSE = 31.44, p < .01, g 2 = .16, illustrated in Fig.…”

Section: Calibrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“I’ll remember this!” Effects of emotionality on memory predictions versus memory performance

Zimmerman

Kelley

2010

Journal of Memory and Language

110

119

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Section: Calibrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“I’ll remember this!” Effects of emotionality on memory predictions versus memory performance

Zimmerman

Kelley

2010

Journal of Memory and Language

110

119

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“…These metacognitive judgments can be made on an item-by-item basis (local level) or for the task as a whole (global level). The accuracy of judgments can be assessed with calibration scores (Van Overschelde & Nelson, 2006). This type of score shows the degree to which the judgment differs from the actual level of performance.…”

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confidence: 99%

The effect of feedback on children’s metacognitive judgments: a heuristic account

Geurten

Meulemans

2016

Journal of Cognitive Psychology

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In three experiments, we investigated whether the feedback effect on the accuracy of children's metacognitive judgments results from an improvement in monitoring processes or the use of the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic. Experiment 1 revealed that adding feedback increased the accuracy of young children's (aged 4, 6, and 8 years) memory prediction. In Experiment 2, the influence of an external anchor on children's metacognitive judgment was established. Finally, in Experiment 3, two memory tasks that differed in terms of difficulty were administered. Participants were randomly assigned to an anchoring (high/low/no anchor) and a feedback (feedback/no feedback) condition. Results demonstrated that children in the feedback condition adjusted their predictions toward the feedback, regardless of the task's difficulty. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that external information provided by feedback is used as an anchor for judgment. This interpretation is strengthened by the correlation found between the two scores computed to assess participants' susceptibility to anchoring and feedback effects, which indicates that children who are more sensitive to the anchoring effect are also more sensitive to the feedback effect.Keywords: Metacognition, Judgment, Feedback, Anchoring, Children Running head: Feedback effect in children 3The Effect of Feedback on Children's Metacognitive Judgments: A Heuristic AccountDecades of intensive studies on metacognition have established that how accurately people assess their memory determines how efficiently they regulate their learning (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; Kornell & Bjork, 2007; Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006;T. O. Nelson & Narens, 1994;Son, 2010;Thiede, 1996). Usually, the ability to assess internal cognitive processes (i.e., metacognitive monitoring) is appraised by asking participants to judge the quality of their performance before (prospective judgment) or after (retrospective judgment) carrying out a cognitive task. These metacognitive judgments can be made on an item-by-item basis (local level) or for the task as a whole (global level). The accuracy of judgments can be assessed with calibration scores (Van Overschelde & Nelson, 2006). This type of score shows the degree to which the judgment differs from the actual level of performance.Children's metacognitive judgments are far from accurate. Many developmental studies have demonstrated that children regularly overestimate their memory performance when making metacognitive judgments (e.g., Kvavilashvili & Ford, 2014; Lipko, Dunlosky, Lipowski, & Merriman, 2012). Interestingly, this effect seems to be particularly pronounced when the accuracy of global prospective judgments is examined (Lipko, Dunlosky, & Merriman, 2009;Shin, Bjorklund, & Beck, 2007;Yussen & Levy, 1975). For instance, Shin et al. (2007) presented three groups of children (aged 6, 7, and 9 years old) with a set of pictures, then asked them to estimate how many items they thought they would be able to remember on a subsequent test (glob...

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“…Further, reconsideration of the confidence judgments was made in a context somewhat detached in time and context from the initial confidence judgments, while the first round of judgments occurred directly after participants answered each question. In line with this reasoning, research on JoLs has found that delayed JoLs are often more predictive of future performance than immediate JoLs (Nelson and Dunlosky 1991;van Overschelde and Nelson 2006).…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 82%

The accuracy of meta-metacognitive judgments: regulating the realism of confidence

Buratti

Allwood

2012

Cogn Process

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Can people improve the realism of their confidence judgments about the correctness of their episodic memory reports by deselecting the least realistic judgments? An assumption of Koriat and Goldsmith's (Psychol Rev 103:490-517, 1996) model is that confidence judgments regulate the reporting of memory reports. We tested whether this assumption generalizes to the regulation of the realism (accuracy) of confidence judgments. In two experiments, 270 adults in separate conditions answered 50 recognition and recall questions about the contents of a just-seen video. After each answer, they made confidence judgments about the answer's correctness. In Experiment 1, the participants in the recognition conditions significantly increased their absolute bias when they excluded 15 questions. In Experiment 2, the participants in the recall condition significantly improved their calibration. The results indicate that recall, more than recognition, offers valid cues for participants to increase the realism of their report. However, the effects were small with only weak support for the conclusion that people have some ability to regulate the realism in their confidence judgments.

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Delayed judgments of learning cause both a decrease in absolute accuracy (calibration) and an increase in relative accuracy (resolution)

Cited by 25 publications

References 19 publications

“I’ll remember this!” Effects of emotionality on memory predictions versus memory performance

“I’ll remember this!” Effects of emotionality on memory predictions versus memory performance

The effect of feedback on children’s metacognitive judgments: a heuristic account

The accuracy of meta-metacognitive judgments: regulating the realism of confidence

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