Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision

Why apply causal reference to intentional concepts? A polemic with Michael and MacLeod

“…But, as Mallon et al (2009) have noted (see also Lycan 1988;Cummins 1991;Schouten and De Jong 1998), this argument only works in conjunction with the implicit claim that reference is fixed by descriptions.…”

Reduction, elimination, and levels: The case of the LTP-learning link

“…There is, we think, a third option, nam ely, the idea of mutually interacting and changing theories which allows for conceptual dissimilarity across levels while at the same time honoring the dem and for interlevel coherence. This option suggests how we can m ake sense of the relations between psychology and neuroscience in general and what is going on in LTP research in particular (for a general criticism of elim inativism, see Schouten & Looren de Jong, 1998) .…”

Content and Consciousness Revisited

“…For one thing, they make referential continuity too easy (and are thus unable to make sense of cases of referential failure), since all they require is consistency of a causal relation between agent and entity (e.g. Schouten and De Jong 1998 ). Moreover, there seems to be no theory-free way to pick out a natural kind or a causal entity in the fi rst place, given that any phenomenon instantiates numerous natural kinds and many causal elements acting conjointly.…”