Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy

On ‘Defending The Phenomenal Concept Strategy’

“…By providing these examples, Stoljar demands an explanation from proponents of PCS why it isn't the case that the psychophysical conditional is also a priori while it just fails to be a priori synthesizable. Diaz-Leon [2008] defends PCS against Stoljar's criticism. She claims that Stoljar actually misrepresents the resources of PCS.…”

Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded

“…In fact, it is due to the presence of such ties between number and red sensation that (3) both is a priori and fails to give rise to an appearance of contingency. What is crucial for the PCS is the claim that phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated from physical or functional concepts insofar as there are no sufficient conditions for being a phenomenal state that can be specified a priori in physical or functional terms (see also Diaz‐Leon, ; and Balog, ). The fact that (3) is a priori does nothing to undermine the PCS's contention that such sufficient conditions cannot be given a priori .…”

A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection

“…Since these associated recognitional capacities pick out phenomenal concepts directly, the recognitional account of phenomenal concepts also provides an explanation of how phenomenal concepts can be conceptually isolated from physical or functional concepts. That is to say, a recognitional account of phenomenal concepts provides support for the view that phenomenal and physical (or functional) concepts are different psychological entities, insofar as they involve different deployment and reference-fixing mechanisms (see also Diaz-Leon, 2008).…”

“…Proponents of a posteriori physicalism who defend physicalism from epistemic arguments by citing the nature of phenomenal concepts include: Balog, and ; Diaz‐Leon, and ; Elpidorou, and ; Hill, ; Hill and McLaughlin, ; McLaughlin, ; Levin, and ; Loar, , and ; Papineau, and ; Perry, ; and Tye, and . Not everyone is convinced that such a response to epistemic arguments is successful.…”