<i>A Posteriori</i> Physicalism and Introspection

Elpidorou, Andreas

doi:10.1111/papq.12068

Cited by 19 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Since it is not the case, we conclude either that physicalism is false (Chalmers, 2003, Nida-Rümelin, 2007, Goff, 2011 or that Revelation is false (Loar, 1997, Levin, 2007, Schroer, 2010. Others deny that the combination of Revelation and physicalism entails that we are presented with the physical nature of our phenomenal properties (Damnjanovic, 2012, Elpidorou, 2016. The second way has to do with whether the relation implied by Revelation between the subject and her phenomenal properties can be physically implemented, i.e., satisfies what Levine (2007) Another line of research has continued to use Revelation in a context of discussions about the nature of colors (Byrne and Hilbert, 2007), and has then given rise to a naïve realist take on Revelation (Campbell, 2005, Allen, 2011.…”

Section: The Revelation Thesismentioning

confidence: 80%

Revelation and Phenomenal Relations

Broi¹

2019

The Philosophical Quarterly

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Revelation, or the view that the essence of phenomenal properties is presented to us, is as intuitively attractive as it is controversial. It is notably at the core of defences of anti-physicalism. I propose in this paper a new argument against Revelation. It is usually accepted that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness or brightness, stand in (phenomenal) relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that is, to be fixed by what their relata are. I argue that, under some plausible additional premises, no account of what grounds these relations in the essence of their relata is consistent with Revelation, at least if we take common phenomenological descriptions for granted. As a result, the plausibility of Revelation is undermined. One might however resist this conclusion by weakening the epistemic relation postulated between subjects and their phenomenal properties.

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Section: The Revelation Thesismentioning

confidence: 80%

Revelation and Phenomenal Relations

Broi¹

2019

The Philosophical Quarterly

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“…This is the worry that the phenomenal concept strategy cannot account for the idea that phenomenal concepts afford us substantive knowledge about the nature of phenomenal properties. For replies to this challenge from a posteriori physicalists, see Schroer (2010), Díaz-León (2014), Elpidorou (2016), and Taylor (2018). 25 In an unpublished paper, I put forward an argument for the intuitiveness of revelation which takes the form of an inference to the best explanation.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation

Liu¹

2019

Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics

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In the philosophy of mind, revelation is the claim that the nature of qualia is revealed in phenomenal experience. In the literature, revelation is often thought of as intuitive but in tension with physicalism. While mentions of revelation are frequent, there is room for further discussion of how precisely to formulate the thesis of revelation and what it exactly amounts to. Drawing on the work of David Lewis, this paper provides a detailed discussion on how the thesis of revelation, as well as its incompatibility with physicalism, is to be understood.

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“…The metaphysics of consciousness cannot be decided by mere conceivability considerations either, since what is conceivable with respect to consciousness is constrained only by phenomenologically available, intuitive invariants. Its scope is correspondingly widened by what is phenomenologically unavailable ; and it is fallacious to infer a property’s inapplicability to consciousness from its introspective unavailability (see, e.g., Williford, 2007; Elpidorou, 2016). This undermines the claim that phenomenology can determine the full metaphysical possibility space with respect to consciousness and explains how so many incompatible metaphysical positions could all seem equally conceivable.…”

Section: The “Hard Problem” Representationalism and Phenomenal Selfmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood

et al. 2018

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We summarize our recently introduced Projective Consciousness Model (PCM) (Rudrauf et al., 2017) and relate it to outstanding conceptual issues in the theory of consciousness. The PCM combines a projective geometrical model of the perspectival phenomenological structure of the field of consciousness with a variational Free Energy minimization model of active inference, yielding an account of the cybernetic function of consciousness, viz., the modulation of the field’s cognitive and affective dynamics for the effective control of embodied agents. The geometrical and active inference components are linked via the concept of projective transformation, which is crucial to understanding how conscious organisms integrate perception, emotion, memory, reasoning, and perspectival imagination in order to control behavior, enhance resilience, and optimize preference satisfaction. The PCM makes substantive empirical predictions and fits well into a (neuro)computationalist framework. It also helps us to account for aspects of subjective character that are sometimes ignored or conflated: pre-reflective self-consciousness, the first-person point of view, the sense of minenness or ownership, and social self-consciousness. We argue that the PCM, though still in development, offers us the most complete theory to date of what Thomas Metzinger has called “phenomenal selfhood.”

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A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection

Cited by 19 publications

References 48 publications

Revelation and Phenomenal Relations

Revelation and Phenomenal Relations

Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation

The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood

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