Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism

Littlejohn, Clayton

doi:10.1111/j.2153-960x.2011.00516.x

Cited by 11 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 8 publications

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“…Recent criticisms of the phenomenal thesis have brought our attention to two kinds of counterexamples. First, it is argued that various strange or even dangerous propositions can appear true to us, such as “This walnut tree was planted on April 24, 1914,” or “Religion X is true, and we should kill anyone who does not subscribe to X” (Littlejohn, 2011; Markie, 2005; Tooley, 2013). It would be excessively permissive to grant justification to these propositions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force

Teng

2023

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, which has been a prominent theory of perceptual justification over the past two decades. Moreover, I investigate several alternative possibilities in which phenomenal force might still be deemed as significant, but ultimately demonstrate that its epistemic role remains marginal at best.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force

Teng

2023

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Phenomenal Conservatism

Moretti

2020

Seemings and Epistemic Justification

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Phenomenal conservatism is the view according to which, roughly, the way things seem or appear to be is a source of epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, for instance, one can have some justification for believing that the cat is on the mat simply because it seems visually to one that the cat is on the mat. 3 The central intuition of the phenomenal conservative is that one should grant that things are the way they appear to be unless one has reasons for doubting it. Phenomenal conservatism is internalist in character at least because it takes the seeming-based justification of one's beliefs to depend entirely on one's mental states (cf. Huemer 2006(cf. Huemer , 2011(cf. Huemer , 2014. 4 Phenomenal conservatism is customarily associated with Michael Huemer's work. Huemer defines phenomenal conservatism as follows:(PC) If it seems to [a subject] S that P, then, in absence of defeaters S thereby has some degree of justification for believing that P. (2007: 30) 5Although (PC) is about S's propositional justification, there is a corresponding version of it about S's doxastic justification: 61 Thanks to Tommaso Piazza and Chris Tucker for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I'm grateful to the Von Humboldt Foundation for financial support through a Visiting Fellowship at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy.2 For a general introduction to phenomenal conservatism and cognate views see Tucker (2013b). A more elementary introduction is Huemer (2014). A rich anthology of phenomenal conservatism and related views is Tucker (2013a).3 Phenomenal conservatism must not be confused with doxastic conservatism, which says that one's mere believing that P gives one some justification for P provided that one has no reason for doubting that belief (cf. Huemer 2014: §1d.

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Phänomenaler Konservatismus

Huemer¹

2019

Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie

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Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism

Cited by 11 publications

References 8 publications

The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force

The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force

Phenomenal Conservatism

Phänomenaler Konservatismus

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