Phenomenal Conservatism

Abstract

Phenomenal conservatism is the view according to which, roughly, the way things seem or appear to be is a source of epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, for instance, one can have some justification for believing that the cat is on the mat simply because it seems visually to one that the cat is on the mat. 3 The central intuition of the phenomenal conservative is that one should grant that things are the way they appear to be unless one has reasons for doubting it. Phenomenal conservatism is internalist in character at least because it takes the seeming-based justification of one's beliefs to depend entirely on one's mental states (cf. Huemer 2006(cf. Huemer , 2011(cf. Huemer , 2014. 4 Phenomenal conservatism is customarily associated with Michael Huemer's work. Huemer defines phenomenal conservatism as follows:(PC) If it seems to [a subject] S that P, then, in absence of defeaters S thereby has some degree of justification for believing that P. (2007: 30) 5Although (PC) is about S's propositional justification, there is a corresponding version of it about S's doxastic justification: 61 Thanks to Tommaso Piazza and Chris Tucker for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I'm grateful to the Von Humboldt Foundation for financial support through a Visiting Fellowship at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy.2 For a general introduction to phenomenal conservatism and cognate views see Tucker (2013b). A more elementary introduction is Huemer (2014). A rich anthology of phenomenal conservatism and related views is Tucker (2013a).3 Phenomenal conservatism must not be confused with doxastic conservatism, which says that one's mere believing that P gives one some justification for P provided that one has no reason for doubting that belief (cf. Huemer 2014: §1d.

On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA

“…Here I will work with two formulations of Phenomenal Conservativism: PC1: If it seems to S that P, then S is prima facie justified in believing P. PC2: If it seems to S that P, and S lacks any defeaters for believing P, then S is ultimate facie justified in believing P. Some comments on PC1 and PC2. Though there is some dispute as to what seemings are (see Moretti (2015) for discussion), they are supposed to be phenomenal states whereby a proposition appears to one as true. PC1 forms the core element of a theory of justification-it tells us, at least in part, where justification "comes from," what can confer it, namely seemings.…”

Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness

“…5PC has been targeted by various arguments but it is dubious it has been lethally struck. For objections and responses see Tucker (2013), Moretti (2015) and Huemer (2018). …”

Reforming reformed epistemology: a new take on thesensus divinitatis

“…For more on phenomenal conservatism begin with Huemer (2001), Idem (2006), Idem (2007), Tucker (2010), and the essays in Tucker (2013b). See also Moretti (2015) for an overview of recent work. Others defend views that are plausibly forms of phenomenal conservatism and certainly in the spirit of it.…”