Deepening the Controversy over Metaphysical Realism

Abstract

A significant ontological commitment is required to sustain metaphysical realism—the view that there is a single, objective way the world is—in order to defend it from common sense objections. This involves presupposing the existence of properties (or tropes, or universals) and relations between them which define the objective structure of the world. This paper explores the grounds for accepting this ontological assumption and examines a sceptical argument which questions whether, having assumed the world is objectively divided into fundamental properties, we could ever know which properties these are. It then assesses the responses available to the metaphysical realist, arguing that the sceptical difficulty cannot merely be dismissed by means of another assumption in the manner of radical scepticism, as David Lewis suggests, but that the sceptic's argument might be defused by the non-question-begging success of some form of strong scientific realism which links the predicates of our scientific theories directly to the fundamental properties the world contains. It remains unclear however whether this widely accepted metaphysical theory can find principled philosophical support.

What Matters in (Naturalized) Metaphysics?

“…20 Lewis (1983, 218-227, especially 226), for instance, makes the assumption that our understanding of the natural world corresponds to the objective nature of reality. I have argued elsewhere (Allen 2002) that Lewis's presupposition is poorly justified, but I will not pursue this point here as such a move would clearly be excluded within naturalized metaphysics.…”

“…Although traditional 'a priori' metaphysical views can avoid the problem of ontological choice which, I argue, afflicts naturalized metaphysics, I have argued elsewhere that these metaphysical theories face a further sceptical challenge when they are conjoined with realism about classification within ontological categories; that is, which properties, or which tropes, or which universals (and so on) exist (see Allen 2002). The naturalized metaphysician faces sceptical problem with both ontological categories and classification within these categories.…”

“…Allen | 241 metaphysics in naturalized metaphysics. Also, see Allen 2002. All the counterarguments to the scientific realists' strategies to find out which natural properties objectively exist also apply to attempts to discover which ontological categories there are.…”