Can Theoretical Underdetermination support the Indeterminacy of Translation? Revisiting Quine's ‘Real Ground’

Abstract

It is commonly believed that Quine's principal argument for the Indeterminacy of Translation requires an untenably strong account of the underdetermination of theories by evidence, namely that that two theories may be compatible with all possible evidence for them and yet incompatible with each other. In this article, I argue that Quine's conclusion that translation is indeterminate can be based upon the weaker, uncontroversial conception of theoretical underdetermination, in conjunction with a weak reading of the ‘Gavagai’ argument which establishes the underdetermination of the sense and reference of subsentential terms. If underdetermination is considered to be a widespread phenomenon in science, or in inductive reasoning more generally, then the Indeterminacy of Translation will be widespread too. Finally, I briefly consider two issues concerning the scope of this conclusion about the Indeterminacy of Translation: first, whether the argument presupposes behaviourism; and second, whether indeterminacy is restricted to the case of radical translation. I argue that the answer to both these questions is negative, and thus that the thesis of semantic indeterminacy remains relevant to those who disagree with Quine about some issues concerning the nature of mind and language.

Sobre as razões de Quine para a indeterminação da tradução holofrástica

“…Kirk Miller (2006, p. 101) sustenta que "o 'verdadeiro fundamento' para a doutrina da indeterminação não é a construção de um conjunto alternativo de hipóteses analíticas coerente com os fatos sobre significado-de-estímulo [stimulus meaning], mas a ideia de que a teoria física é subdeterminada por toda evidência observacional possível" -conforme veremos, isso é exatamente o oposto do que Quine veio a pensar depois de 1975. Allen (2010) e Khani (2018) também dizem que a razão "mais ampla e profunda" de Quine para a indeterminação holofrástica é a subdeterminação. Todos esses autores consideram deficiente esse argumento de Quine, algo com o que o próprio Quine explicitamente concordou no final da década de 1970de (ver Kirk, 1977.…”

Quine's argument “from above”

“…Miller claims that “the ‘real ground’ of the indeterminacy doctrine is not the construction of an alternative set of analytical hypotheses consistent with the facts about stimulus meaning, but the idea that physical theory is underdetermined” (Miller, 2006, p. 101)—as we shall see, this is exactly the opposite of what Quine came to think after 1975. Allen (2010) and Khani (2018) likewise argue that Quine's “broader and deeper” reason for indeterminacy is his argument “from above.” These authors all find the argument lacking, apparently disregarding or ignoring that this is something with which Quine himself came to agree in the late 1970s (see Kirk, 1977, p. 141 n. 1; and Quine's, 1976 letter to Kirk quoted below). As we shall see, Quine's revised thesis of underdetermination in his “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World” (1975) rendered the argument “from above” inane as a reason for the indeterminacy of translation.…”

Islam and Science: The Philosophical Grounds for a Genuine Debate

“…There are weaker versions of this doctrine too. See, for example, Allen (2010), Hossein Khani (2018), Bergström (1993), and Laudan (1990).…”