Deep Platonism

Carmichael, Chad

doi:10.1111/phpr.12190

Cited by 12 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…It seems fair to assume that what he meant by "Platonic" was literally Platonic or something very close to it. And Platonism puts Aristotelianism over its head: from an ontological, explanatory, epistemic, and semantic point of view, abstract objects, transcendent universals included, are basic and fundamental; concrete particulars, the whole realm of sensible objects, if it exists at all, is grounded, explicable or ultimately analysable in terms of abstract objects (Carmichael, 2016;Cowling, 2017;Harte, 2019;Irwin, 1999).…”

Section: G E Moore On Concepts and Judgmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

G. E. Moore on Concepts and Judgment

Domínguez

2021

Anál. Filos.

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In “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defends the strange thesis according to which “[i]t seems necessary… to regard the world as formed of concepts”. Philosophers have offered distinct understandings of this proposal, in particular of what Moorean concepts really are. In this article I discuss and reject three of them: one, according to which Moorean concepts are universals within the framework of a bundle theory of concrete particulars (Nelson, 1962; Baldwin, 1990); a second one, according to which Moorean concepts are particulars within a mereological framework of analysis (Bell, 1999); and a third one, according to which Moorean concepts are a sui generis category, resulting from his alleged rejection of the substance (particular)/attribute (universal) distinction (MacBride, 2018). I end by defending my own understanding, which highlights the openly Platonic stance of the young G. E. Moore.

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Section: G E Moore On Concepts and Judgmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

G. E. Moore on Concepts and Judgment

Domínguez

2021

Anál. Filos.

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“…Chad Carmichael gives a different explanation of why a given haecceity is necessarily incommunicable (). He defines haecceities as properties that are incommunicable in the sense implied by the formula above, making it analytic that if a given property is a haecceity, it is incommunicable.…”

Section: Arguments From the Avoidance Of Brute Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Brute necessity

Cleve

2018

Philosophy Compass

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“…This argument won't convince everyone. Some realists are ‘extreme realists’ who believe that only properties are fundamental and that everything else is built from them [Borghini ; Carmichael ; Dasgupta ; Paul , ; van Cleve ]—presumably, (i) would then be false and Property would be the sole basic category. Similarly, class nominalists say properties are derivative (since they're grounded in their members) and will presumably deny that Property is basic (since it's a sub‐category of Class ); in that case, Property being non‐basic according to mereological nominalism is no big whoop.…”

Section: Motivationsmentioning

confidence: 99%