2018
DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12516
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Brute necessity

Abstract: In a growing number of papers, one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. That is, they imply that there are propositions p such that (a) it is necessary that p, but (b) there is no explanation why it is

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
4
0

Year Published

2020
2020
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
8

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 15 publications
(4 citation statements)
references
References 76 publications
0
4
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Recently, however, Fine's view has come under a different form of attack. Rather than criticizing the claim that the counterexamples discussed in his (1994) lead to a rejection of the modal account of essence, and as a further consequence to (FE), Leech (2018), Mackie (forthcoming), Noonan (2018), Romero (2019), Van Cleve (2018) and Wildman (2018) directly criticize (FE). Roughly, this line of criticism has it that essences cannot ground or explain modality or that the Finean cannot consistently argue that they do 3 .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recently, however, Fine's view has come under a different form of attack. Rather than criticizing the claim that the counterexamples discussed in his (1994) lead to a rejection of the modal account of essence, and as a further consequence to (FE), Leech (2018), Mackie (forthcoming), Noonan (2018), Romero (2019), Van Cleve (2018) and Wildman (2018) directly criticize (FE). Roughly, this line of criticism has it that essences cannot ground or explain modality or that the Finean cannot consistently argue that they do 3 .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 5 Note that the LG-argument is not the only argument that has been raised against Ground by Status In particular, Glazier ( 2017a ) also develops a parallel argument for the case of existential generalizations. For some further arguments, see Glazier ( 2017a ); Kappes ( 2020 ), Kappes ( 2021 ); Van Cleve ( 2018 ); and Zylstra ( 2019 ). For a response to Zylstra, see Vogt ( forthcoming ).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…philosophical subdisciplines. Threats to free will and moral responsibility are invigorated since prominent versions of compatibilism still require some alternative possibilities (e.g., Lewis, 1981;Sartorio, 2016); counterfactual reasoning is rendered vacuous; and the metaphilosophical landscape is seismically altered if we are not constrained by the norm of explaining necessity (see Van Cleve, 2018, for examples) and if possibilities cannot feature as premises in arguments (see van Inwagen, 1998, for examples).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%