Deconstructing the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America

Abstract

PurposeThe objective of this study is to address the diplomatic and economic implications of the participation of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).Design/methodology/approachThe study examines official documents related to the BRI and LAC's signing of the Memorandum of Understanding within the framework of the BRI (MoUs) in order to look into what it means to join the BRI. Additionally, it also introduces the findings of articles in Asian Education and Development Studies' current issue published in 2020.FindingsIn LAC, the BRI does not represent a new policy, but rather the updating and rebranding of a pre-existing one. The BRI primarily consists of an official discursive framework which aims to build a coherent narrative for a wide range of different projects and policies geared toward the improvement of connectivity with China through the development of trade and investments. However, most of these projects were implemented prior to the BRI. Pragmatism lies at the core of this framework which neither has a regulated accession process nor any binding effects. As a result, the signing the MoU represents, foremost, a diplomatic mise-en-scène. The study operates under the belief that BRI membership is not dichotomous; rather, it must be observed in terms of the countries' level of participation. In line with this, the implementation of a generalized BRI policy in LAC countries would not be advisable. Moreover, it must be noted that the BRI's reach to Latin America can be rather problematic due to the fact that the latter was not initially a participant.Originality/valueThe study aims to explore the significance of the BRI beyond the official discourse and discuss the involvement of LAC countries in it. Scholars studying the BRI in other regions have noted that there is not enough information on this policy in the context of LAC.

China's Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America: What has Changed?

“…This suggests that the inclusion of LAC in the BRI was not part of a Chinese "grand strategy" but rather the outcome of the interests of a range of actors in both China and LAC (Oliveira and Myers, 2021). The role of local agency is also important in understanding why some countries in the region have not signed BRI MOUs with China (Serrano-Moreno et al, 2020).…”

“…Those authors who do not regard the BRI as a major change in Sino–LAC relations are sceptical about its likely economic impacts (Ferchen, 2021; Serrano Moreno et al, 2020). Similarly, the International Institute for Strategic Studies comments that “the recent wave of BRI-themed activities in the LAC region is unlikely to bring fundamental change to China–LAC economic relations” (IISS, 2018: ix).…”

“…Herreros, 2018; Oropeza et al, 2018; Zhang, 2019; Zottele and Zottele, 2020). Some however have questioned this, suggesting that the inclusion of LAC in the BRI does not reflect a major change and is merely a new label for the relations that already existed between China and the region (Ferchen, 2021; Serrano-Moreno et al, 2020). This parallels the international debate over whether the BRI is really new, discussed earlier.…”

China’s Foreign Aid Political Drivers: Lessons from a Novel Dataset of Mask Diplomacy in Latin America during the COVID-19 Pandemic

“…Partnership status served as a proxy for the political salience of each country to the MFA. The concept of partnership emerged within Chinese diplomacy after the end of the Cold War, and the first strategic partnership was with Brazil in 1993 (Feng and Huang, 2014; Serrano Moreno et al, 2020). Partnerships are a structured framework for collaboration, yet organised in a loose and non-binding way that aims to enable the pursuit of shared interests and the addressing of common challenges in different issue areas and facilitate (future) co-operation (Strüver, 2017: 36).…”

El retorno de Japón hacia América Latina y el Caribe: ¿una estrategia de hedging ante el crecimiento de China?

“…Esta nueva iniciativa de Japón de fomentar la conectividad se basa en tres pilares: conectividad económica (a través de las cadenas globales de valor e infraestructura), conectividad de valores (multilateralismo basado en reglas) y conectividad de sabiduría (para enfrentar los desafíos a través de la innovación) (MoFA, 2018). En este sentido esta estrategia se podría concebir como una forma de contrarrestar el proyecto bri de China, que ha tenido un fuerte impacto en la región a partir de la invitación en 2018 en el foro China-CeLAc de Santiago (Serrano Moreno, Telias, & Urdinez, 2020).…”