Decisions of knowledge transfer in technology innovation alliance: a stackelberg leader-followers model

Abstract

The decision-making processes of knowledge transfer are regarded as the Stackelberg leader-followers games between the core firm and partners in the technology innovation alliance. Basically, a decision-making model of knowledge transfer is established to analyze the influences of knowledge transfer decisions of the core and partners. The analysis results point out that the precondition of the existence and development of alliances is that the core firm's knowledge marginal revenues are large enough. Partners transfer their knowledge capital according to the proportion structure of their own marginal revenues. There is a positive correlation between the knowledge transfer decisions of core firm and its own marginal revenues, and a negative correlation between the knowledge transfer decisions of core firm and the sum of partners' marginal revenues.

Differential Game Analysis of Scientific Crowdsourcing on Knowledge Transfer

“…It is very important to understand the balance of knowledge transfer investment and revenue. Therefore, the knowledge transfer decision-making behavior of the crowdsourcing subject can be understood as the process of the game between the initiator and the solver [40]. The game theory discussed in this paper enables us to decide strategically in scientific crowdsourcing activities, such as knowledge transfer, which is basically an interactive decision-making process.…”

Knowledge dilemmas within organizations: Resolutions from game theory

“…[99] derived a set of theorems and proofs that use what they call the lattice value matrix game to solve practical problems. Other game theoretic studies on decision making models for inter-organizational collaborative knowledge creation and transfer, primarily in technology innovation alliances have also been proposed [79,7,51,27].…”

Knowledge transfer and innovation alliance stability

“…Because there is no direct competition between firms A and B, there are two competitors in the market, the alliance and firm C. The profit function of the alliance and firm C is equation (2). Their optimal problems of profits are…”

“…Because of its inherent properties, including common pressure on decision-making centre, mutual compromises, regular negotiations, the benefit conflict unceasingly, as well as lack of the powerful control method to members, they may betray cooperation promises which leads to mutual distrust, information sharing channels impeded, control costs rise, technological innovation efficiency drop and so on, resulting in the alliance instability ultimately [2], [3]. In order to keep competitive advantage, firms must transfer their knowledge, and the Innovation Alliance has provided a good opportunity for knowledge transfer and learning [4].…”