Is there a common and general basis for confidence in human judgment? Recently, we found that the properties of confidence judgments in the sensory domain mirror those previously established in the cognitive domain; notably, we found underconfidence on easy sensory judgments and overconfidence on hard sensory judgments. In contrast, data from the Uppsala laboratory in Sweden suggest that sensory judgments are unique; they found a pervasive underconfidence bias, with overconfidence being evident only on very hard sensory judgments. Olsson and Winman (1996) attempted to resolve the debate on the basis of methodological issues related to features of the stimulus display in a visual discrimination task. A reanalysis of the data reported in Baranski and Petrusic (1994), together with the findings of a new experiment that controlled stimulus display characteristics, supports the position that the difference between the Canadian and the Swedish data is real and, thus, may reflect cross-national differences in confidence in sensory discrimination.We feel sure, our expectationbecomesconviction,long before we have the objective right to be anything more than moderatelyexpectant. (Titchener, 1905,pp. 53-55) Contemporary students of confidence in human judgment should find Titchener's assertion both curious and intriguing. We should find it curious because there was actually very little data at the time that bore directly on the issue of whether people are good assessors of their own judgments and capabilities. Moreover, the data that did exist-which were almost exclusively psychophysicalwere not entirely supportive of his claim. Ifanything, the available data suggested that the relation between degree of certainty and overt judgmental accuracy is largely an individual matter: