Decision framework for evaluating the macroeconomic risks and policy impacts of cyber attacks

Kelic, Andjelka; Collier, Zachary A.; Brown, Christopher W.; Beyeler, Walter E.; Outkin, Alexander V.; Vargas, Vanessa N; Ehlen, Mark Andrew; Judson, Christopher H.; Zaidi, Ali H.; Leung, Billy; Linkov, Igor

doi:10.1007/s10669-013-9479-9

Cited by 15 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Due to the large scope of the electronics industry, and the increasing interconnectedness of the global supply chain, there are many different economic sectors and stakeholders that have the potential to be harmed. For instance, if a microprocessor is corrupted, then any number of economic sectors could be at risk, including energy, retail, or finance …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, if a microprocessor is corrupted, then any number of economic sectors could be at risk, including energy, retail, or finance. (5) Most critically, counterfeit electronics carry national security implications. (4) In fact, it has been found that counterfeit electronic parts misrepresented as military grade can be easily purchased on the Internet (6) and that counterfeits have been found in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) supply chains, including counterfeit memory devices in the mission computers of missile systems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Traceability and Risk Analysis Strategies for Addressing Counterfeit Electronics in Supply Chains for Complex Systems

et al. 2016

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Within the microelectronics industry, there is a growing concern regarding the introduction of counterfeit electronic parts into the supply chain. Even though this problem is widespread, there have been limited attempts to implement risk-based approaches for testing and supply chain management. Supply chain risk management tends to focus on the highly visible disruptions of the supply chain instead of the covert entrance of counterfeits; thus counterfeit risk is difficult to mitigate. This article provides an overview of the complexities of the electronics supply chain, and highlights some gaps in risk assessment practices. In particular, this article calls for enhanced traceability capabilities to track and trace parts at risk through various stages of the supply chain. Placing the focus on risk-informed decision making through the following strategies is needed, including prioritization of high-risk parts, moving beyond certificates of conformance, incentivizing best supply chain management practices, adoption of industry standards, and design and management for supply chain resilience.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Traceability and Risk Analysis Strategies for Addressing Counterfeit Electronics in Supply Chains for Complex Systems

et al. 2016

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“…As part of this component of the model, markets are assumed to return to equilibrium after a shock. REMI is one of just a few models that includes both the computable general equilibrium and input‐output modeling logic (Kelic et al., ).…”

Section: Methodological Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Macroeconomic Effects of 2017 Through 2025 Federal Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards

Carley

Zirogiannis

Duncan

et al. 2019

J Policy Anal Manage

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In the absence of a national carbon price, the federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards and the related greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) standards are the primary mechanisms through which the U.S. reduces transportation GHG emissions. In 2012, these standards were set to rise for light‐duty vehicles between 2017 and 2025, eventually achieving a target of 54.5 miles per gallon in 2025. Since 2012, conditions have changed: forecasts of future gasoline prices have dropped dramatically, consumers have demanded larger vehicles, and the cost of compliance appears to be larger than previously thought. In this article, we analyze the possible macroeconomic effects of the standards with both 2012 inputs and updated inputs to reflect these new market developments. The results reveal that the short‐term effects of the federal standards will be negative, but the long‐term effects will be positive, using both 2012 and updated inputs. The transition from annual negative employment impacts to positive impacts occurs between 2023 and 2026, depending on which set of assumptions are used. Possible revisions to the standards that freeze them at 2020 levels or decrease their stringency reduce short‐term negative impacts but also reduce long‐term positive impacts. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications as they relate to the current energy and climate policy conditions.

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“…Pawlak and Wendling (2013) then explore the existing and future trends in governmental policies related to cybersecurity and identify gaps and potential paths forward. Next, Kelic et al (2013) describe an agent-based decision framework for modeling the macroeconomic impacts of cyber attacks on vulnerable industry sectors, such as the oil and gas industry. Finally, Vaishnav et al (2013) outline a novel framework connecting cybersecurity and international relations as a single system and comment on the properties of such a system.…”

Section: Cognitive Domainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Four domains of cybersecurity: a risk-based systems approach to cyber decisions

2013

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With pervasive reliance on information technology, the robustness and security of these systems are critical to diverse infrastructure systems and particularly to resilience of industry, military, society, community, etc. As safeguards evolve and are implemented, adversaries develop novel ways to breach information technology systems, access sensitive data, and disrupt critical infrastructure. While significant advances in the field of cybersecurity have been achieved, solutions have focused more on the technical issues at component levels such as threat detection, encryption, and other mitigation procedures and technologies and less on how to address overall cyber-influenced risk and to support decisions at level of large-scale systems.This issue explores the theory, methods, and applications of systems analysis for cybersecurity (including software and hardware and other perspectives) with linkages to other subject areas such as risk management, systems engineering, and strategic decision-making. In particular, there is a need to approach cybersecurity risks from a multi-scale, systems perspective, recognizing the diverse interactions among cyber, physical, and human systems (Lambert et al. 2013). In this direction, our first paper frames the rest of the issue in terms of cyber-resilience, wherein Linkov et al. (2013) discuss how decision-makers require the ability to plan for threats and absorb, recover, and adapt to threats after they occur along the physical, information, cognitive, and social domains in which these systems exist. The remaining articles are organized by these domains respecting that several of the articles cross domains. Physical domainThe physical domain includes hardware and software and networks as building blocks of cyber infrastructure. Gilmore et al. (2013) outline the risks posed by counterfeit electronic parts in the context of hardware security. They discuss a validation strategy based on infrared analysis and blind source separation to authenticate suspected counterfeit parts and stop counterfeits from moving downstream in the supply chain. Information domainMonitoring, information storage, and visualization are features of the information domain. The issue features several articles that focus on risks within the information domain. First, Baiardi and Sgandurra (2013) discuss a simulation-based risk assessment methodology that models adaptive threat agents as well as identifies effective countermeasures. Cam and Mouallem (2013) then describe a model that dynamically models mission assurance through monitoring of cyber assets and includes a risk management scheme to mitigate risks to acceptable levels. Finally, Ezell et al. (2013) describe a framework to model the risks and impacts of cyber attacks on traffic control systems. Cognitive domainInformation should be properly analyzed and sensed as well as used for decision-making in the cognitive domain.

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Decision framework for evaluating the macroeconomic risks and policy impacts of cyber attacks

Cited by 15 publications

References 32 publications

Traceability and Risk Analysis Strategies for Addressing Counterfeit Electronics in Supply Chains for Complex Systems

Traceability and Risk Analysis Strategies for Addressing Counterfeit Electronics in Supply Chains for Complex Systems

The Macroeconomic Effects of 2017 Through 2025 Federal Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards

Four domains of cybersecurity: a risk-based systems approach to cyber decisions

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