Decision costs in legislative bargaining: an experimental analysis

Moya, Luis Miguel Miller; Vanberg, Christoph

doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9866-z

Cited by 39 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Winter (2010), Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey (2012), Tergiman (2012) and Miller and Vanberg (2013), proposers receive higher shares than the other members of the coalition, but these shares remain far below what is predicted by the theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Communication in Multilateral Bargaining

Agranov

Tergiman

2013

SSRN Journal

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One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to -and do -engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal. We conduct an experimental test of the Baron-Ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap-talk communication before a proposal is submitted. We find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed. Communication increases proposer power through two channels. First, it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept. Second, it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Communication in Multilateral Bargaining

Agranov

Tergiman

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…The payoff to the player who receives the lower share is predicted to be in the range from 0 to δb = 0.406. Miller and Vanberg (2013) compare the costs of reaching agreement under majority and unanimity rule in the context of an experimental bargaining game with δ = 0.9. They find patterns very similar to those reported in the previous literature.…”

Section: Explicit Subgame Perfect Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kagel, Sung, and Winter (2010) report one or more rounds of delay in 28% of the cases when δ = 0.95. Miller and Vanberg (2013) consider the case where δ = 0.9 and find one or more rounds of delay before acceptance takes place in 25% of the cases.…”

Section: Equilibria With One-period Delaymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kagel, Sung, and Winter (2010) are interested in the consequences of veto power in committees and use the BF specification with three players and a discount factor of 0.95 as a benchmark. Miller and Vanberg (2013) use the BF model with three players and a discount factor of 0.9 when comparing the costs of reaching agreement under majority and unanimity rule.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining

Herings¹,

Meshalkin

Predtetchinski³

2018

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the threeperson case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player and allocates no payoff to the third player, a proposal which is accepted without delay. Laboratory experiments show various deviations from this equilibrium, where different offers are typically made and delay may occur before acceptance. We address the issue to what extent these findings are compatible with subgame perfect equilibrium and characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for any value of the discount factor. We show that for any proposal in the interior of the space of possible agreements there exists a discount factor such that the proposal is made and accepted. We characterize the values of the discount factor for which equilibria with one-period delay exist. We show that any amount of equilibrium delay is possible and we construct subgame perfect equilibria such that arbitrary long delay occurs with probability one.

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“…23 Denoting player k's payoff conditional on being proposer as π k , continuation values are given by z i = δ n π i + δ µ i − 1 n + α z i + (1 − δ)r i (1)…”

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confidence: 99%

Legislative Bargaining with Heterogeneous Disagreement Values: Theory and Experiments

2015

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous 'disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanimity rule, equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values. Under all less-thanunanimity rules, expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule, finding support for these predictions. Terms of use: Documents in

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Decision costs in legislative bargaining: an experimental analysis

Cited by 39 publications

References 11 publications

Communication in Multilateral Bargaining

Communication in Multilateral Bargaining

Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining

Legislative Bargaining with Heterogeneous Disagreement Values: Theory and Experiments

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