Deceit on the Road to War

Schuessler, John M.

doi:10.7591/9781501701627

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…The magnetic active emerge on the boundary between the fast and slow zones, and the whole flow cycle takes 22 years, which is as twice as long the sunspot cycle. It was immediately suggested that the torsional oscillations represent a back reaction of the magnetic field of active regions (Yoshimura 1981;Schuessler 1981). Later, torsional oscillations were linked to ephemeral active regions that appear at high latitudes, which are observed in the declining phase of a solar cycle, but apparently represent the magnetic field of the following cycle, and also linked to the migrating pattern of coronal green-line emission (Wilson et al 1988).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamo Wave Patterns inside of the Sun Revealed by Torsional Oscillations

Kosovichev

Пипин

2019

ApJL

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Torsional oscillations represent bands of fast and slow zonal flows around the Sun, which extend deep into the convection zone and migrate during solar cycles towards the equator following the sunspot butterfly diagram. Analysis of helioseismology data obtained in 1996-2018 for almost two solar cycles reveals zones of deceleration of the torsional oscillations inside the Sun due to dynamo-generated magnetic field. The zonal deceleration originates near the bottom of the convection zone at high latitudes, and migrates to the surface revealing patterns of magnetic dynamo waves predicted by the Parker's dynamo theory. The analysis reveals that the primary seat of the solar dynamo is located in a high-latitude zone of the tachocline. It suggests a dynamo scenario that can explain 'extended solar cycles' previously observed in the evolving shape of the solar corona. The results show a substantial decrease of the zonal acceleration in the current solar cycle and indicate further decline of activity in the next solar cycle. Although the relationship between the magnitude of zonal deceleration and the amount of emerged toroidal field that leads to formation of sunspots is not yet established, the results open a new perspective for solar cycle modeling and prediction using helioseismology data.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamo Wave Patterns inside of the Sun Revealed by Torsional Oscillations

Kosovichev

Пипин

2019

ApJL

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“…But secrecy can have negative connotations because of its association with unsavory or unlawful activities. 5 This is due to prominent scandals where leaders deceived their publics or concealed foreign policy decisions in anticipation of popular backlash (Schuessler, 2010(Schuessler, , 2015. In the U.S., for example, the covert military operations most ingrained in popular memory range from distasteful to disastrous.…”

Section: H0 (Null Hypothesis)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These questions relate to a growing literature on secrecy in international relations. Much research in this area focuses on why governments employ secrecy in various aspects of foreign policy (e.g., Carson, 2016Carson, , 2018Carnegie andCarson, 2020, 2019;Carson and Yarhi-Milo, 2017;Cormac and Aldrich, 2018;Daugherty, 2006;Haas and Yarhi-Milo, 2020;Hafner-Burton, Steinert-Threlkeld and Victor, 2016;Johnson, 2022;Lester, 2015;McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017;Nutt and Pauly, 2021;O'Rourke, 2018;Otto and Spaniel, 2021;Pauly, 2022;Poznansky, 2019Poznansky, , 2020Stasavage, 2004;Schuessler, 2015;Yoder and Spaniel, 2022) and how they navigate trade-offs between the benefits of secrecy and the norms and institutions that facilitate transparency in democratic politics (e.g., Colaresi, 2014;Downes and Lilley, 2010;Forsythe, 1992;Poznansky, 2015;Smith, 2019;Spaniel and Poznansky, 2018). However, we know much less about how the public reacts to secrecy, especially in the context of international negotiations.…”

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confidence: 99%

Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics

Myrick

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Many international agreements, from routine trade deals to high-stakes nuclear agreements, are negotiated in secret. However, we have a limited understanding of how secrecy in a negotiation shapes attitudes towards the agreement. Public opinion matters because it informs government decisions about when to conceal or reveal information during a negotiation. In a survey experiment of U.S. adults, I first examine overall attitudes towards secrecy in security and economic agreements. I then randomize government justifications for negotiating in secret: improved success, protection of sensitive information, and anticipation of criticism from domestic and international opponents. I find that respondents are generally averse to secrecy in international negotiations, but there are justifications for its use that they perceive as more legitimate. Secrecy is more permissible when negotiations contain sensitive information or when it improves the likelihood that agreements are reached. It is less permissible when governments negotiate in secret to avoid domestic criticism.

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“…In addition to the risk of blowback, deception runs the risk of eroding public trust in government, forfeiting a crucial political resource that is essential for leaders in order to conduct an effective foreign policy (Hetherington 1998). John Schuessler (2015), on the other hand, has argued that democratic leaders often resort to deception to sell war to their domestic public. He shows that leaders retain considerable ability to manipulate domestic audiences without being fully exposed, and that these deceptive tactics are particularly effective in the prewar period, when the information gap between leaders and the public is greatest and the latter's perception of reality is most elastic.…”

Section: Literature On Deceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Punishes Leaders for Lying About the Use of Force? Evaluating The Microfoundations of Domestic Deception Costs

Yarhi-Milo

Ribar

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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It is a common stereotype that leaders lie, but for all our beliefs about how normal it is for a president to lie to the public we know next to nothing about how voters might actually view this conduct. Drawing from literature in behavioral economics, we theorize that voters apply their attitudes towards interpersonal lies when judging leaders, with people who see lying as more socially acceptable being less willing to punish leaders for exhibiting this behavior. Using a novel vignette-style survey experiment, we find strong support for our theory: despite widespread willingness to punish leaders who lie, individuals high in Machiavellianism and Self-Monitoring are far less willing to punish presidents for lying than their low-type peers, and in some cases do not punish at all. Using robustness checks and causal mediation analysis, we confirm that views regarding the moral acceptability of lying drive responses to presidential deception.

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Deceit on the Road to War

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Dynamo Wave Patterns inside of the Sun Revealed by Torsional Oscillations

Dynamo Wave Patterns inside of the Sun Revealed by Torsional Oscillations

Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics

Who Punishes Leaders for Lying About the Use of Force? Evaluating The Microfoundations of Domestic Deception Costs

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