Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics

Abstract

Many international agreements, from routine trade deals to high-stakes nuclear agreements, are negotiated in secret. However, we have a limited understanding of how secrecy in a negotiation shapes attitudes towards the agreement. Public opinion matters because it informs government decisions about when to conceal or reveal information during a negotiation. In a survey experiment of U.S. adults, I first examine overall attitudes towards secrecy in security and economic agreements. I then randomize government justifications for negotiating in secret: improved success, protection of sensitive information, and anticipation of criticism from domestic and international opponents. I find that respondents are generally averse to secrecy in international negotiations, but there are justifications for its use that they perceive as more legitimate. Secrecy is more permissible when negotiations contain sensitive information or when it improves the likelihood that agreements are reached. It is less permissible when governments negotiate in secret to avoid domestic criticism.

Rethinking the Tradeoffs of Within-Subjects Designs in International Relations Experiments

“…In this paper, we highlight the pros and cons of using a previously uncommon but increasingly popular experimental design-within-subject designs-in IR research (e.g. Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, 2021;Myrick, 2020Myrick, , 2023Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2022;Tingley and Walter, 2011). We reassess the existing scholarship on their tradeo s (Cli ord, Sheagley and Piston, 2021;McDonald and Hanmer, 2023) and extend it by examining cross-country external validity of their results.…”

“…(Naoi, Shi and Zhu, 2022;Son and Park, 2022)); or to randomize or counterbalance the order of within-subjects treatments (e.g. Adamson and Kimbrough, 2022;Hundley, 2019;Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003;Myrick, 2020Myrick, , 2023Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2022).8…”

“…First, it is a combined within-subjects and between-subjects design that manipulates the level of a key factor/variable via both within-subjects and between-subjects assignments. This sets apart our experiment from other single-module within-subjects experiments, most of which can be classified into two categories: an experiment with a within-subjects assignment of a key factor accompanied by a separate between-subjects assignment of the key factor (Naoi, Shi and Zhu, 2022;Son and Park, 2022); or an experiment with a within-subject assignment of a key factor and with between-subjects assignments of other factors (Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, 2021;Kertzer and Zeitzo , 2017;Myrick, 2020Myrick, , 2023Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2022;Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer and Renshon, 2018;Yarhi-Milo and Ribar, 2022).14 Both categories of single-module within-subjects experiments focus on testing IR-related hypotheses about treatment e ects and utilize within-subjects designs (combined with between-subjects designs) as a tool for doing so (e.g. Bush and Prather, 2021;Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, 2021;Kertzer and Zeitzo , 2017;Myrick, 2020Myrick, , 2023Tingley and Walter, 2011;Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer and Renshon, 2018;Yarhi-Milo and Ribar, 2022).…”

“…Alternative designs, such as the within-subject design, have been much less common (Lupton and Webb, 2022) but are being increasingly adopted by IR researchers (e.g. Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, 2021;Myrick, 2020Myrick, , 2023Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2022;Tomz and Weeks, 2013;Tingley and Walter, 2011).…”

Foreign policy and citizens’ ontological security: An experimental approach

“…While many scholars underscore structural and rational incentives for invoking secrecy and operating clandestinely in world affairs (e.g. Carnegie and Carson, 2020;Myrick, 2023;O'Rourke, 2018;Poznansky, 2020), this study shifts the limelight to cultural and ideational factors. By suggesting that certain FPPs, which might seem strategically justified, are in fact provoking ontological insecurity among individual citizens, it will illustrate the unanticipated, collateral costs incurred by leaders who divulge secrets.…”