Death Penalty Abolition and the Ratification of the Second Optional Protocol

Abstract

LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author's final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process. Some differences between this version and the published version may remain. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=502104 This article is structured as follows: The next section clarifies the relationship between domestic death penalty abolition and ratification of the Second Optional Protocol, arguing that ratification is the more far-reaching decision. We then discuss which factors are suggested by theory as determinants of ratifying this Protocol, focusing on political factors, which we argue to be more important than cultural, legal or social factors. This is followed by a presentation of the research design and the results of the empirical estimations, the implications of which are discussed in the final, concluding section. DEATH PENALTY ABOLITION AND THE SECOND PROTOCOL POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SECOND PROTOCOL RATIFICATIONIn this section, we look at which political factors theory would suggest as likely determinants of Second Protocol ratification. We start with international relations theories that focus on how external factors persuade or pressure countries to ratify. We then move on to theories that focus on internal or domestic factors, particularly theories of regime type (democracy vs.autocracy and the type and length of democratic regime) and partisan theories. 6From a (neo-)realist perspective, powerful countries ratify international treaties and pressure less powerful countries into doing the same if this is in their perceived interest.Power is often approximated by population size and per capita income 10 and much evidence suggests that more populous and more developed countries are more active members of the world system in that they negotiate, sign and ratify more international treaties in many areas of international co-operation than smaller and/or poorer countries, for example, in the area of environment 11 , monetary affairs 12 and women's rights 13 . However, the question is whether more powerful countries regard an international protocol aimed at the abolition of the death penalty to be in their own interest. With respect to the Second Protocol, the problem is that the United States (US), the most powerful country in the world, is divided into states that are ...

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