David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyrrhonism

Abstract

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Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question

“…Such an account has in 6 This reading dates all the way back to Hume's contemporaries;Fieser (2005) includes several texts from Hume's early critics which accuse him of "dogmatic Pyrrhonism." This reading has some pedigree: in the last century, it was prominently defended in Popkin (1951) and Fogelin (1983); more recently, it has been endorsed in Baxter (2008, ch. 1);Baxter (2018); Fogelin (2006); Fogelin (2009);and Garfield (2019).…”

“…As with his reading of the Treatise, Fogelin (2009, 157-58) takes the Hume of the Enquiry to abandon excessive skepticism purely on the basis of psychological forces: in this case, mitigated skepticism is the result of Pyrrhonism clashing with common life and reflection. 51 For whatever reason, Pyrrhonian readings of the Enquiry, defended in Popkin (1951) andFogelin (1983), have not proven as recently popular as they are with the Treatise, although there does not appear to be an obvious systematic reason why this should be the case. 52 Such a line can be traced back to Noxon (1973, 180-87), and is more recently defended in Millican 2002a, 164-66) and Ryan (2017, 324-26).…”

Hume’s understanding of the relationship between scepticism and philosophy

“…Nekolicina interpretatora smatra da, ukoliko antički skepticizam shvatimo na ovaj način, onda imamo razloga da i Hjumov skepticizam okarakterišemo kao pironizam, pošto on smatra da je na skepticizam nemoguće odgovoriti argumentima, kao i da su naša verovanja iracionalna. Više o ovakvom shvatanju Hjumovog skepticizma videti u Popkin 1951, Popkin 1952, Fogelin 1983, Baxter 2006, Brahami 2009i Palkoska 2012 jedan čovek ne može da izdrži, i koju prvi i najtrivijalniji događaj u životu mora da poljulja i uništi." (Hume 2007c: 155) Povezan sa ovim je drugi oblik umerenog skepticizma, koji pokazuje da se ne samo stav prema rezultatima, nego i ciljevi i predmet filozofskih istraživanja umerenog skeptika značajno razlikuju od onih koje usvajaju drugi filozofi (McCormick 2004: 421).…”

“…Hjumovo tvrđenje da u prepuštanju prirodnim sklonostima i zadovoljstvu vidi izvor sopstvene filozofije ne govori ništa o prirodi takve filozofije niti upućuje na njene moguće trajne i korisne efekte. Tačno je da on u Raspravi skeptika predstavlja kao nekoga ko konstantno oscilira između prirodnog dogmatizma i filozofskog skepticizma (Popkin 1951: 406, Ribeiro 2009, budući da nastoji da pokaže da su skeptički argumenti neoborivi dok se bavimo filozofijom, ali da ih gubimo iz vida čim se vratimo svakodnevnom životu. Međutim, nije tačno da u Raspravi nema čak ni nagoveštaja olakšanja ovih oscilacija, kao što to tvrdi Ribeiro (Ribeiro 2009: 219).…”

Psychologism Revisited in Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology

“…A controversy concerning the interpretation of Hume's realism versus pyrrhonic skepticism about perception of the external world appears in the many references to some of the voluminous secondary literature on this topic inWilson 1989, Livingston 1991, Wilson 1991. Important earlier works for understanding this exchange includePrice 1940 andPopkin 1966.…”