Das Schweizer Parlament

Bütikofer, Sarah

doi:10.5771/9783845250069

Cited by 7 publications

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“…Jene zeigen an, welche Ständerätinnen und Ständeräte vor ihrem Wahlmandat auf Bundesebene ein politisches Amt im Kanton bekleideten -und aufgrund ihrer elitebiografischen Prägung in besonderer Weise für die Problemlagen in den Kantonshauptorten sensibilisiert sind (vgl. Bütikofer, 2014Bütikofer, , 2020Pilotti, 2017;Freiburghaus, 2020). 4 Originäre Daten legen die kantonale Herkunft der Amtsdirektorinnen und Amtsdirektoren der Bundesämter offen (1848/1912-2021).…”

Section: Zwischenfazit I: Wie Sich Die Interessengruppen-undunclassified

“…Analysen des ständerätlichen Abstimmungsverhaltens ergeben nämlich, wie der Parteiendruck zunimmt (vgl. Bütikofer, 2014Bütikofer, , 2020Benesch et al, 2018Benesch et al, , 2020. Eine nachweislich disziplinierende Wirkung übten die im Frühjahr 2014 als Folge aufgeflogener «Zählpannen» (NZZ, 8.3.2013) installierte elektronische Abstimmungsanlage sowie neue Offenlegungs-bzw.…”

Section: Direktkontaktunclassified

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Lobbyierende Kantone

Freiburghaus

2023

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Not only do interest groups lobby, but regions do too: This book re-examines federalism through the lenses of interest groups and lobbying research. It focuses on ‘shared rule’, a foundational pillar in federal theory that necessitates the active involvement and representation of subnational units in federal policymaking. Based on new and original data, the study illuminates how the 26 Swiss cantons make their voices heard at the federal level. It explores traditional federal institutions, such as second chambers, alongside professionalised tactics of intergovernmental lobbying. Furthermore, the book empirically analyses the conditions under which the cantons succeed in shaping federal policy and politics according to their preferences.

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Section: Zwischenfazit I: Wie Sich Die Interessengruppen-undunclassified

Section: Direktkontaktunclassified

Lobbyierende Kantone

Freiburghaus

2023

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“…As the upper house has introduced such a voting system only recently, we analyze all votes cast in the upper house for the period between 2013 and 2019, straddling two legislative periods (Bailer, Bütikofer, and Hug 2019). We complemented this data with information on final passage votes in the upper house for two previous legislatures coded based on video recordings (see Bütikofer 2014; Martin and Hug 2020). In addition, we have data on parliamentary activities by MPs, more specifically on parliamentary initiatives, motions, and postulates that they submitted 15…”

Section: Data and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While for three of our parliamentary chambers22 the full record of all votes is freely available, the federal upper house only makes available the full record for a subset of votes (see Benesch, Bütler, and Hofer 2018; Bütikofer 2014). 23 Therefore, while we will use voting data to assess the loyalty of MPs to the principal(s) (and their ideological position), we first rely on a quantitative analysis of speeches to determine whether MPs toe the party line and/or follow the constituency preferences, respectively their own preferences.…”

Section: Empirical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We use the data depicted in Figure 1 in a more systematic analysis below but will first discuss our other measures for shirking behavior based on voting behavior. While, as we noted above, roll‐call votes have been rare in the Swiss upper house for much of the period we study (see Benesch, Bütler, and Hofer 2018; Bütikofer 2014; Bütikofer and Hug 2010), we can draw on data collected in the upper house based on video recordings for a subset of votes (see Bütikofer 2014; Martin and Hug 2020). We use all final passage votes for the 47th (2003–2007) and the 48th (2007–11) legislative periods gleaned from these video recordings for the upper house.…”

Section: Empirical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shirking and Slacking in Parliament

Frech

Goet

Hug

2020

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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How and why do the activities of members of parliament (MPs) change in response to electoral constraints? In this article, we draw on unique and newly collected data from the Swiss federal chambers and two cantonal parliaments (Basel‐Stadt and Basel‐Land) to explore the effects of electoral constraints. Leveraging variation in mandatory term limits, we study the extent to which term‐limited MPs engage in shirking—that is, move away from their principal, whether it be the party and/or voters—and slacking—that is, reduce their parliamentary activities. Our analysis, which draws on a combination of novel roll‐call votes and speech data, yields mixed results: while there is no evidence of shirking by term‐limited MPs in the cantonal parliaments, we find some indications of such behavior among term‐limited legislators in the federal chambers. These latter legislators also engage in some limited slacking, which is not observable in the cantonal parliaments. Our findings shed light on the (political) implications of term limits and the effect of electoral constraints on legislator behavior.

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Evaluation use and learning in public policy

Bundi

Trein

2022

Policy Sci

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Scientific evidence has become increasingly important for the decision-making processes in contemporary democracies. On the one hand, research dealing with the utilization of scientific knowledge in the political process has pointed out that decision-makers learn from evidence to improve policies to solve problems. On the other, scholars have underlined that actors learn from evidence to support their political interests regardless of how it affects the policy problem. One conventional insight from the policy learning literature is that higher salience of a policy issue makes it much less likely that decision-makers use evidence in an “unpolitical” way. Nevertheless, only few studies have investigated systematically how differences regarding issue salience between policy fields impact on how decision-makers learn from evaluations at the individual level. Using multilevel regression models on data from a legislative survey in Switzerland, this paper shows that salience and technical complexity of policy issues do not automatically lead to less policy learning and to more political learning from policy evaluations. Nevertheless, this article’s empirical analysis also points out that issue salience increases policy learning from evaluations if the policy issue is technically complex. Our findings contribute to research on policy learning and evidence-based policy making by linking the literature on policy evaluation and learning, which helps analyzing the micro-foundations of learning in public policy and administration.

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Das Schweizer Parlament

Cited by 7 publications

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Lobbyierende Kantone

Lobbyierende Kantone

Shirking and Slacking in Parliament

Evaluation use and learning in public policy

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