Cyber Security Threats in Synchrophasor System in Wams

Kumar, S. Satheesh; Soni, M. K.; Jain, Dinesh Kumar

doi:10.5120/20172-2355

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The difference is more apparent in the 118-bus network than in the 14-bus network, so we report the computation times for the former. 3 Specifically, for simultaneous attack on two PMUs in the 118-bus system, Algorithm 2 takes 2 hours and 10 minutes. On the other hand, Algorithm 1 required more than 48 hours to solve the total of ( 118 2 ) nonconvex problems, and the execution was terminated at 48 hours.…”

Section: A Vulnerable Pmu Locationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In an FDI attack, the attacker tries to inject false data that are not detectable by bad data detection algorithms into the network; see e.g., the recent works [1], [2]. GPS spoofing is caused by transmitters mimicking the GPS signal with the intention of altering the GPS time estimated by the PMU's GPS receiver [3], [4]. These attacks maliciously introduce erroneous time stamps, thereby inducing a wrong phase angle in the PMU measurements [5], and are also called time synchronization attacks (TSAs).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Vulnerability Analysis of Smart Grids to GPS Spoofing

Risbud

Gatsis

Taha

2019

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

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Sensors such as phasor measurement units (PMUs) endowed with GPS receivers are ubiquitously installed providing real-time grid visibility. A number of PMUs can cooperatively enable state estimation routines. However, GPS spoofing attacks can notably alter the PMU measurements, mislead the network operator, and drastically impact subsequent corrective control actions. Leveraging a novel measurement model that explicitly accounts for the GPS spoofing attacks, this paper formulates an optimization problem to identify the most vulnerable PMUs in the network. A greedy algorithm is developed to solve the aforementioned problem. Furthermore, the paper develops a computationally efficient alternating minimization algorithm for joint state estimation and attack reconstruction. Numerical tests on IEEE benchmark networks validate the developed methods.

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Section: A Vulnerable Pmu Locationmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Vulnerability Analysis of Smart Grids to GPS Spoofing

Risbud

Gatsis

Taha

2019

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

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“…Many authentication and authorization algorithms are proposed to secure synchrophasor data over communication channels [57]. These methods range from conventional encryption methods to cyber trust.…”

Section: Cybersecurity Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Survey on synchrophasor data quality and cybersecurity challenges, and evaluation of their interdependencies

Sundararajan

Khan

Moghadasi

2018

J. Mod. Power Syst. Clean Energy

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Synchrophasor devices guarantee situation awareness for real-time monitoring and operational visibility of the smart grid. With their widespread implementation, significant challenges have emerged, especially in communication, data quality and cybersecurity. The existing literature treats these challenges as separate problems, when in reality, they have a complex interplay. This paper conducts a comprehensive review of quality and cybersecurity challenges for synchrophasors, and identifies the interdependencies between them. It also summarizes different methods used to evaluate the dependency and surveys how quality checking methods can be used to detect potential cyberattacks. In doing so, this paper serves as a starting point for researchers entering the fields of synchrophasor data analytics and security.

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“…Moreover, being a typical cyberphysical system, the cyber-layer defence technologies could also be critical to secure microgrid secondary control systems. When wireless communication links are used for signal communication between the MGCC and DGs, wireless spoofing attacks could be one of the primary cyber threats [23]. Therefore, wireless spoofing and data encryption are mainly considered as the attack and defence actions in this work.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game theoretic vulnerability management for secondary frequency control of islanded microgrids against false data injection attacks

Liu

Chen

2021

IET Cyber-Phy Sys Theory & Ap

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While most existing works ignore securing the communication of control signals in microgrids' centralized secondary frequency control, here, a stochastic game between the microgrid control centre (MGCC) and the attacker for enhancing the vulnerability of the MGCC to false data injection (FDI) attack (wireless spoof attack) is proposed. The vulnerability to wireless spoof attack is assessed based on the controllability Gramian when the FDI attack is modelled as the malicious control input that aims to drive the microgrid state to undesired values. In the formulated zero-sum two-player Markov game, the state is uniquely associated with the vulnerability index defined by the trace of the controllability Gramian with respect to the attack input. Moreover, the utility function of the stochastic game includes not only the costs related to conducting spoof attack and encryption actions but also the possible remedy costs associated with the resulted vulnerability levels. In turn, the potential impacts of the cyber-layer action choices on the performance of the physical power system are considered when designing the optimal attack and defence strategies. A distribution feeder system with four distributed generators (DGs) is used for simulation studies. The vulnerability assessment results show that the vulnerability level increases when the attacker compromises more on the communication links between the MGCC and DGs. In the simulated game, mixed stationary attack and defence strategies are predominate when considering the uncertainty of the other player.This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

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Cyber Security Threats in Synchrophasor System in Wams

Cited by 7 publications

References 15 publications

Vulnerability Analysis of Smart Grids to GPS Spoofing

Vulnerability Analysis of Smart Grids to GPS Spoofing

Survey on synchrophasor data quality and cybersecurity challenges, and evaluation of their interdependencies

Game theoretic vulnerability management for secondary frequency control of islanded microgrids against false data injection attacks

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