Cyber Security in Control of Grid-Tied Power Electronic Converters—Challenges and Vulnerabilities

Abstract

Grid tied power electronic converters are key enabling technologies for interfacing renewable energy sources, energy storage, electrical vehicles, microgrids and high voltage dc transmission lines with the electrical power grid. As number of power converters in modern grids continually increase, their monitoring and coordinated control in a way to support the grid have become topics of increased practical and research interest. In connection with this, latest standards have also defined mandatory set of control parameters for grid-tied converters, which should be adjustable by a remote entity that sends commands through a communication network. While such remote control capability allows many new control functions in grid tied converters, it also renders them vulnerable to cyber attacks. The aim of this paper is first to shed light on portions of the power converter control systems that are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Next, typical cyber-attacks are overviewed by considering different applications of grid-tied converters. Further, the impact of different types of cyber attacks on grid support functions is studied. Finally, the paper is concluded with summary and recommendation for further research.

An Event-Driven Resilient Control Strategy for DC Microgrids

“…By definition, uncoordinated attacks can be defined as a set of attack elements, which do not follow synchronization theory in Wx attack = 0. As a consequence, it follows from (6) to conclude that L T u a = 0 for uncoordinated attacks. Remark III: Using (13), it can be formalized that the set of detection criterion…”

“…To detect the presence of cyber attacks, bad-data detection tests are usually performed to identify residual element(s) between estimated and measured states [6]. These attacks can be classified differently into a primary superset with false data injection attacks (FDIAs) [7], denial of service (DoS) [8] and replay attacks as its elements [9].…”

Clustering-Based Penalty Signal Design for Flexibility Utilization

“…Co-simulation Platform; Simulation packages for assessing system integration of components typically cover only one sub-domain, while simplifying the others. Co-simulation overcomes this by coupling sub-domain models that are described and solved within their native environments, using specialized solvers and validated libraries [27]. Besides, it is possible to solve a problem that consists of subproblems with different time steps through co-simulations.…”

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“…Further, data intrusion from stealth attacks is also possible, as demonstrated in [8]- [12]. Such attacks are capable of increasing the generation cost without causing any obvious indications of power imbalance.…”