Cyber-Risk Assessment for Autonomous Ships

Tam, Kimberly; Jones, Kevin

doi:10.1109/cybersecpods.2018.8560690

Cited by 53 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…For the rest of this paper, the focus will be on quantitative risk assessments for the reasons above [7]- [9], [11], [16]. The majority of qualitative assessment methods make use of mathematical or computing models, which simplify the problem by only considering the factors that are relevant to the risk.…”

Section: B Risk Assessment Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Assessing human risk with both static and dynamic risk factors has been done previously [30], [31], although it has primarily been used on sex offenders, where static factors include history and dynamic factors include substance abuse. A significant shift in maritime that shall occur in the future is remote control and autonomy [16], which may shift crew risk factors towards remote operators.…”

Section: A Static Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Of the last type of human considered, both non-crew and non-passenger, the only people of interest are malicious third parties. In the cyber-realm that means different types of hackers [16], along with physical attackers like criminals, or pirates, and those interested in warfare. Therefore, the only people who can affect maritime risk in the ¬operators R category are attackers, therefore the dynamic elements worth measuring are their resources and goals, which can easily change.…”

Section: B Dynamic Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, the purpose of this article is to (1) examine how the maritime risk landscape can be modelled in terms of cyber, physical, static, and dynamic factors, (2) determine which are relevant for measuring maritime risk, and (3) determine if they are accounted for in existing frameworks. Specifically we evaluate National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST [13], [14]), Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA [15]), and Marine Cyber-Risk Assessment (MaCRA [16]). Section II covers background material for maritime and risk assessment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Factors Affecting Cyber Risk in Maritime

Tam

Jones

2019

2019 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (Cyber SA)

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To ensure the safety of ships and ports, groups and individuals, at all levels of the maritime sector, use analysis to identify potential hazards and their outcomes. One of the most relied upon methods is using a risk assessment tool to define and prioritise threats. A disadvantage of most existing assessment frameworks, however, is their inability to update risks dynamically as factors, such as the environment, change. In the maritime sector, a range of dynamic factors is needed to measure risks, but most conventional frameworks are unable to use them to revise and update their risk profiles. In addition to static and dynamic, maritime operational risks can be affected by elements classified as cyber, cyber-physical, or physical in nature. This demonstrates the relatively equal presence of information and operational technology (i.e. IT/OT) used, however most quantitative risk assessment frameworks are normally limited to one or the other. This article explores the full range of cyberrelated risk factor types within maritime in order to evaluate applicable risk frameworks and suggest improvements that could help each of those tools assess maritime-cyber risks specifically.

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Section: B Risk Assessment Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Static Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Dynamic Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Factors Affecting Cyber Risk in Maritime

Tam

Jones

2019

2019 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (Cyber SA)

Self Cite

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“…In some ways, autonomous ships and ports are built on top of IoT technology, as the autonomy requires more digital monitoring (e.g., more sensors), increasing the number of possible cyber vulnerabilities (Tam and Jones 2018). Therefore, again, analysing the communications between computing systems is critical for next generation research capabilities.…”

Section: Autonomousmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-SHIP: Developing Next Generation Maritime Cyber Research Capabilities

Tam

Forshaw

Jones

2019

Conference Proceedings of ICMET Oman

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As a growing global threat, cyber-attacks can cost millions of dollars or endanger national stability and human lives. While relatively well understood in most sectors, it is becoming clear that, although the maritime sector is becoming more digitally advanced (e.g., autonomy), it is not well protected against cyber or cyber-physical attacks and accidents. To help improve sector-wide safety and resiliency, the University of Plymouth (UoP) is creating a specialised maritime-cyber lab, which combines maritime technology and traditional cyber-security labs. This is in response to the lack of research and mitigation capabilities and will create a new resource capability for academia, government, and industry research into maritime cybersecurity risks and threats. These lab capabilities will also enhance existing maritime-cyber capabilities across the world, including risk assessment frameworks, cybersecurity ranges/labs, ship simulators, mariner training programmes, autonomous ships, etc. The goal of this paper is to explain the need for next generation maritime-cyber research capabilities, and demonstrate how something like the proposed Cyber-SHIP Lab (Hardware, Software, Information and Protections) will help industry, government, and academia understand and mitigate cyber threats in the maritime sector. The authors believe a next generation cyber-secure lab should host a range of real, non-simulated, maritime systems. With multiple configurations to mirror existing bridge system set-ups, the technology can be studied for individual system weakness as well as the system-of-systems vulnerabilities. Such as lab would support a range of research that cannot be achieved with simulators alone and help support the next generation of cyber-secure marine systems.

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Cyber-Attacks Against the Autonomous Ship

Kavallieratos

Katsikas

Gkioulos

2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Autonomous ships transferring valuable cargoes and humans in a more efficient and cost effective manner will soon be state of the art technology. Yet, their ICT system architecture and operations have not been defined in full detail. Moreover, multiple cyber security issues remain open and should be addressed. No study to date has analyzed fully the architecture of the autonomous ship, even less so have potential cyber threats and cyber attacks been identified. In this paper we identify and categorize systems that make up an autonomous ship, we propose a generic system architecture, and we analyze the cyber security of the ship by leveraging the STRIDE threat modeling methodology to identify potential cyber attacks, and to analyze the accordant risk. The results will support ship designers and industry towards improving the autonomous ship system architecture and making ship operations more secure.

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Cyber-Risk Assessment for Autonomous Ships

Cited by 53 publications

References 10 publications

Factors Affecting Cyber Risk in Maritime

Factors Affecting Cyber Risk in Maritime

Cyber-SHIP: Developing Next Generation Maritime Cyber Research Capabilities

Cyber-Attacks Against the Autonomous Ship

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