Cyber-insurance survey

Marotta, Angelica; Martinelli, Fabio; Nanni, Stefano; Orlando, Albina; Yautsiukhin, Artsiom

doi:10.1016/j.cosrev.2017.01.001

Cited by 160 publications

(121 citation statements)

References 104 publications

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“…A summary of notations has been provided in the following table. II. RELATED WORKS Cyber insurance has been devised to mitigate cyber-risks by covering some of the losses caused by cyber-attacks [19]- [21]. Various frameworks have been proposed to study cyberinsurance from different perspectives.…”

Section: A Organization Of the Papermentioning

confidence: 99%

$\mathtt{FlipIn}$ : A Game-Theoretic Cyber Insurance Framework for Incentive-Compatible Cyber Risk Management of Internet of Things

Zhang

Zhu

2020

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

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Internet of Things (IoT) is highly vulnerable to emerging Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) that are often operated by well-resourced adversaries. Achieving perfect security for IoT networks is often cost-prohibitive if not impossible. Cyber insurance is a valuable mechanism to mitigate cyber risks for IoT systems. In this work, we propose a bi-level game-theoretic framework called FlipIn to design incentivecompatible and welfare-maximizing cyber insurance contracts. The framework captures the strategic interactions among APT attackers, IoT defenders, and cyber insurance insurers, and incorporates influence networks to assess the systemic cyber risks of interconnected IoT devices. The FlipIn framework formulates a game over networks within a principal-agent problem of moral-hazard type to design a cyber risk-aware insurance contract. We completely characterize the equilibrium solutions of the bi-level games for a network of distributed defenders and a semi-homogeneous centralized defender and show that the optimal insurance contracts cover half of the defenders' losses. Our framework predicts the risk compensation of defenders and the Peltzman effect of insurance. We study a centralized security management scenario and its decentralized counterpart, and leverage numerical experiments to show that network connectivity plays an important role in the security of the IoT devices and the insurability of both distributed and centralized defenders.

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Section: A Organization Of the Papermentioning

confidence: 99%

$\mathtt{FlipIn}$ : A Game-Theoretic Cyber Insurance Framework for Incentive-Compatible Cyber Risk Management of Internet of Things

Zhang

Zhu

2020

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

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“…For that, it is needed to identify what are the security-relevant capabilities of the IoT devices in order to be connected and correctly used. Cybersecurity practices are vital to business and comprise a factor that has not yet been taken into consideration by companies as part of their risk management process [24]. …”

Section: Proposed Cybersecurity Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Ontology-Based Cybersecurity Framework for the Internet of Things

Mozzaquatro

Agostinho

Gonçalves

et al. 2018

Sensors

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The use of sensors and actuators as a form of controlling cyber-physical systems in resource networks has been integrated and referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT). However, the connectivity of many stand-alone IoT systems through the Internet introduces numerous cybersecurity challenges as sensitive information is prone to be exposed to malicious users. This paper focuses on the improvement of IoT cybersecurity from an ontological analysis, proposing appropriate security services adapted to the threats. The authors propose an ontology-based cybersecurity framework using knowledge reasoning for IoT, composed of two approaches: (1) design time, which provides a dynamic method to build security services through the application of a model-driven methodology considering the existing enterprise processes; and (2) run time, which involves monitoring the IoT environment, classifying threats and vulnerabilities, and actuating in the environment ensuring the correct adaptation of the existing services. Two validation approaches demonstrate the feasibility of our concept. This entails an ontology assessment and a case study with an industrial implementation.

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“…If attacks happen and the damage is within the coverage of the insurance policy, the insurer will pay the claim to the customer accordingly. To date, a number of cyber-insurance products have been made available in the market [15]. According to the types of target systems, these products can be categorized into specific groups designed for service providers such as ISPs and clouds, single mobile/work stations, networks of devices and dedicated cyber-physical/industrial systems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Feng

Wang

Xiong

et al. 2021

IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput.

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Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular, we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risks due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market, which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, the cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the infrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the service price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of the blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider also purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself from the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we model the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game.

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Cyber-insurance survey

Cited by 160 publications

References 104 publications

$\mathtt{FlipIn}$ : A Game-Theoretic Cyber Insurance Framework for Incentive-Compatible Cyber Risk Management of Internet of Things

$\mathtt{FlipIn}$ : A Game-Theoretic Cyber Insurance Framework for Incentive-Compatible Cyber Risk Management of Internet of Things

An Ontology-Based Cybersecurity Framework for the Internet of Things

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

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