Cyber-attack on a power plant using bias injected measurements

Modelling issues and aggressive robust load frequency control of interconnected electric power systems

“…This is a state-space representation equivalent (no loss of information) with the original full-state representation, also complying with the formulation (15), which moreover is controllable and can be used for aggressive controller design as done in [7][8][9][10][11].…”

“…This symmetry comes without any loss of generality and makes the interpretation of the responses easily understandable. Table I provides the parameter values used for simulations [1,[6][7][8] The "optimal" choice for the coefficients β i has been shown to be [1,3,8]) while for completeness, we also provide the formulas associated with the area gains K pi and time constants T pi as…”

Set-theoretic detection of data corruption attacks on cyber physical power systems

“…According to [15,16], the input hard constraints do not allow the controllers to perform unsaturated for all states x net 2 X net . To solve this problem, we can define the set A net ¼ X net \ U net and then try to determine the maximal subset of A net that is robust positively invariant with respect to the network dynamics in (11).…”

“…The authors in [15,16] studied bias injection cyberattacks on the frequency sensor measurements, when the attack signal a i was set to a constant value and affected the system indefinitely. It was shown that in the case of a single-area power plant the structural properties of the integral controllers force the frequency deviation to regulate wherever the attack signal dictates.…”

“…The use of a robust invariant set in order to develop a set-theoretic attack detector was first introduced in [15], where the load frequency control loop of a single control area was studied. The key idea was to trigger an alarm whenever the state vector exits the invariant set.…”