Impact Analysis of a Bias Injection Cyber-Attack on a Power Plant

Kontouras, Efstathios; Tzes, Anthony; Dritsas, Leonidas

doi:10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.2493

Cited by 23 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The cyber-attack can also be avoided by maintaining the LFC operation in a safe domain by finding the appropriate state constraints and raising alarm if the state is out of this domain [53]. A set-theoretic approach for false data detection is employed to observe the adversary [54].…”

Section: False Data Injection Preventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cybersecurity Analysis of Load Frequency Control in Power Systems: A Survey

Saxena

Bhatia

Gupta

2021

Designs

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Today, power systems have transformed considerably and taken a new shape of geographically distributed systems from the locally centralized systems thereby leading to a new infrastructure in the framework of networked control cyber-physical system (CPS). Among the different important operations to be performed for smooth generation, transmission, and distribution of power, maintaining the scheduled frequency, against any perturbations, is an important one. The load frequency control (LFC) operation actually governs this frequency regulation activity after the primary control. Due to CPS nature, the LFC operation is vulnerable to attacks, both from physical and cyber standpoints. The cyber-attack strategies ranges from a variety of attacks such as jamming the network communication, time-delay attack, and false data injection. Motivated by these perspectives, this paper studies the cybersecurity issues of the power systems during the LFC operation, and a survey is conducted on the security analysis of LFC. Various cyber-attack strategies, their mathematical models, and vulnerability assessments are performed to understand the possible threats and sources causing failure of frequency regulation. The LFC operation of two-area power systems is considered as a tutorial example to quantify the vulnerabilities. Mitigation strategies through control theoretic approaches are then reviewed and highlighted for LFC operation under cyber-attack.

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Section: False Data Injection Preventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cybersecurity Analysis of Load Frequency Control in Power Systems: A Survey

Saxena

Bhatia

Gupta

2021

Designs

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“…According to [15,16], the input hard constraints do not allow the controllers to perform unsaturated for all states x net 2 X net . To solve this problem, we can define the set A net ¼ X net \ U net and then try to determine the maximal subset of A net that is robust positively invariant with respect to the network dynamics in (11).…”

Section: Attack Detector Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors in [15,16] studied bias injection cyberattacks on the frequency sensor measurements, when the attack signal a i was set to a constant value and affected the system indefinitely. It was shown that in the case of a single-area power plant the structural properties of the integral controllers force the frequency deviation to regulate wherever the attack signal dictates.…”

Section: Switching Signal Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It was shown that small persistent bias injected signals corrupting the frequency sensor measurements can pass undetected. Explicit boundary values of the bias injected signal that ensure a stealthy attack were derived in [16]. However, these bounds are consistently small and therefore impractical from an adversarial point of view, since realistic attack scenarios involve larger values of the attack signal.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Set-theoretic detection of data corruption attacks on cyber physical power systems

Kontouras

Tzes

Dritsas

2018

J. Mod. Power Syst. Clean Energy

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This paper addresses a set-theoretic method for the detection of data corruption cyber-attacks on the load frequency control loop of a networked power system. The system consists of several interconnected control areas forming a power grid. Based on the overall discrete-time network dynamics, a convex and compact polyhedral robust invariant set is extracted and is used as a set-induced anomaly detector. If the state vector exits the invariant set, then an alarm will be activated, and the potential threat is considered disclosed. The attack scenario used to assess the efficiency of the proposed anomaly detector concerns corrupted frequency sensor measurements transmitted to the automatic generation control unit of a compromised control area. Simulation studies highlight the ability of a set-theoretic approach to disclose persistent and intermittent attack patterns even when they occur at the same time with changes in the power load demand.

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“…Namely, the aim of Wang and Lu [22] is to maximise the frequency deviations and minimise attack cost simultaneously by designing an optimal attack scheme on LFC problem. In [23], the vulnerability of the power system is exploited using robust invariance concepts. Attack detection from the estimated state variables of LFC is presented in [24].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Event‐triggered detection of cyberattacks on load frequency control

Patel

Purwar

2020

IET cyber-phys. syst.

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Modern power systems are extensively interlaced with data communication at various levels leading to increased vulnerability to cyberattacks at individual components as well as integrated controls. An effective cyber protection is, therefore, fast becoming an indispensable requirement for the smart grids. A false data injection (FDI) attack on load frequency control (LFC) is a stealth process, which has devastating consequences while at times may also lead to catastrophic system blackouts. This work comprises detailed analyses of the LFC system vulnerability to FDI attacks. It further develops an efficient eventtriggered detection scheme to leverage the LFC protection against FDI attacks. This developed event-triggered generalised extended state observer (ET-GESO) uses Lyapunov stability analysis to derive the event-triggering condition and thereby reduce the communication burden significantly. The feasibility of the proposed ET-GESO is further studied by demonstrating its Zeno behaviour exclusion. Extensive simulation studies are performed on a peer-reported two-area power transacting system and IEEE 39-bus New England system. A comparison study between the proposed technique and reported Kalman filter-based detection scheme is also performed. Different FDI attack formulations and their detection illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed detection method.

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Impact Analysis of a Bias Injection Cyber-Attack on a Power Plant

Cited by 23 publications

References 14 publications

Cybersecurity Analysis of Load Frequency Control in Power Systems: A Survey

Cybersecurity Analysis of Load Frequency Control in Power Systems: A Survey

Set-theoretic detection of data corruption attacks on cyber physical power systems

Event‐triggered detection of cyberattacks on load frequency control

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