2001
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-44723-7_9
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Customer Coalitions in Electronic Markets

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Cited by 52 publications
(47 citation statements)
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“…Yet, the majority of cooperation and coalition formation MAS-related research tends to focus on the way coalitions are formed and consequently concerns issues such as the optimal division of agents into disjoint exhaustive coalitions, division of coalition payoffs and enforcement methods for interaction protocols. While coalition formation and coordination models can be widely found in the electronic market domain, most work in this domain emphasizes mechanisms for forming cooperation for the purpose of aggregating demands in order to obtain volume discounts (Tsvetovat, Sycara, Chen, & Ying, 2000;Yamamoto & Sycara, 2001;Sarne & Kraus, 2003). Several authors have considered the problem of determining the strategy of a group once formed (Ito, Ochi, & Shintani, 2002;Sarne, Manisterski, & Kraus, 2010;Rochlin, Sarne, & Zussman, 2011;Mash, Rochlin, & Sarne, 2012), however their focus was mostly on fully-cooperative agents.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet, the majority of cooperation and coalition formation MAS-related research tends to focus on the way coalitions are formed and consequently concerns issues such as the optimal division of agents into disjoint exhaustive coalitions, division of coalition payoffs and enforcement methods for interaction protocols. While coalition formation and coordination models can be widely found in the electronic market domain, most work in this domain emphasizes mechanisms for forming cooperation for the purpose of aggregating demands in order to obtain volume discounts (Tsvetovat, Sycara, Chen, & Ying, 2000;Yamamoto & Sycara, 2001;Sarne & Kraus, 2003). Several authors have considered the problem of determining the strategy of a group once formed (Ito, Ochi, & Shintani, 2002;Sarne, Manisterski, & Kraus, 2010;Rochlin, Sarne, & Zussman, 2011;Mash, Rochlin, & Sarne, 2012), however their focus was mostly on fully-cooperative agents.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yamamoto and Sycara [6] propose a buyer coalition for-mation scheme GroupBuyAuction, where buyers form a group based on a category of items. Tsvetovat et al [7] use economic incentives to create buying group of buyers who procure goods at a volume discount. Li and Sycara [1] combine coalition formation with combinatorial auction, where each buyer places a bid on items with reservation prices.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cooperation is mainly useful when an agent is incapable of completing a task by itself or when operating as a group can improve the overall performance [17]. Consequently, groupbased cooperative behavior has been suggested in various domains [28], [30]. The recognition of the advantages encapsulated in teamwork and cooperative behaviors is the main driving force of many coalition formation models in the area of cooperative game theory and MAS [26].…”
Section: Extension To Multi-agentmentioning
confidence: 99%