“…Yet, the majority of cooperation and coalition formation MAS-related research tends to focus on the way coalitions are formed and consequently concerns issues such as the optimal division of agents into disjoint exhaustive coalitions, division of coalition payoffs and enforcement methods for interaction protocols. While coalition formation and coordination models can be widely found in the electronic market domain, most work in this domain emphasizes mechanisms for forming cooperation for the purpose of aggregating demands in order to obtain volume discounts (Tsvetovat, Sycara, Chen, & Ying, 2000;Yamamoto & Sycara, 2001;Sarne & Kraus, 2003). Several authors have considered the problem of determining the strategy of a group once formed (Ito, Ochi, & Shintani, 2002;Sarne, Manisterski, & Kraus, 2010;Rochlin, Sarne, & Zussman, 2011;Mash, Rochlin, & Sarne, 2012), however their focus was mostly on fully-cooperative agents.…”