Curbing Clientelism in Argentina

Abstract

In many young democracies, local politics remain a bastion of nondemocratic practices, from corruption to clientelism to abuse of power. In a context where these practices are widespread, will local politicians ever voluntarily abandon them? Focusing on the practice of clientelism in social policy in Argentina, this book argues that only the combination of a growing middle class and intense political competition leads local politicians to opt out of clientelism. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, an original public opinion survey, and cross-municipal data in Argentina, this book illustrates how clientelism works and documents the electoral gains and costs of the practice. In doing so, it points to a possible subnational path towards greater accountability within democracy.

The Political Economy of Clientelism: A Comparative Study of Indonesia’s Patronage Democracy

“…As shorthand, I will dub this approach the “cost perspective.” Along these lines, some argue that as poor voters are more risk-averse and, hence, more easily tempted by clientelistic benefits ( Brusco et al, 2004 ; Kitschelt, 2000 ; Scott, 1972a ), rising incomes reduce the marginal utility of personal inducements for voters, thus increasing the overall cost of clientelistic practices ( Calvo & Murillo, 2004 ; Dixit & Londregan, 1996 ; Magaloni et al, 2007 ; Robinson & Verdier, 2013 ). A second set of arguments focuses on how economic development generates a bigger middle class that might dislike clientelistic practices ( Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007 ; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014 ). A third group focuses on how economic development complicates vote monitoring: In the less tightly knit cities, clientelistic exchanges are more difficult to enforce and thus less effective ( Lehoucq, 2007 ; Stokes et al, 2013 ).…”

“…The clientelism literature sees the growth of the middle class as conducive to more programmatic politics, based on the assumption that a middle class is more likely to despise clientelistic practices and value the rule of law. As this middle class would be less likely to vote for candidates engaging in clientelistic strategies, the growth of the middle class will thus increase the “audience cost” (in terms of loss of votes) of clientelism ( Weitz-Shapiro, 2014 ) and generate a “constituency for universalism” ( Shefter, 1994 , p. 28). In contrast, the constraint perspective suggests that it is not the size of the middle class per se, but rather the extent to which this middle class depends on (a privileged access to) the state for its livelihoods.…”

“…While our understanding of clientelism has benefited greatly from qualitative, ethnographic studies on clientelistic politics in different settings, such studies lack methodological and conceptual tools to compare regions in terms of their relative intensity of clientelistic practices. Since the early 2000s, a new wave of research has adopted a more comparative approach using either survey data (e.g., Brusco et al, 2004 ; Stokes, 2005 ) on or various statistical proxies—such as perceptions of corruption and rule of law measures ( Keefer, 2007 ; Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008 ), the rate of government spending on personnel ( Magaloni et al, 2007 ), or mayoral discretion in the spending of welfare budgets ( Weitz-Shapiro, 2014 ). These methods have various drawbacks.…”

“…The literature is remarkably silent about this conceptual challenge, as most interpretations remain implicit. When “degrees of clientelism” is explicitly conceptualized, the conceptualization is often not comprehensive but rather relates to a proxy for which statistical material is available, such as “a higher ratio of civil servants” ( Keefer, 2007 ) or “more mayoral intervention in selection of welfare recipients” ( Weitz-Shapiro, 2014 ). Herbert Kitschelt’s expert survey offers a more comprehensive and explicit conceptualization, and defines intensity of clientelistic efforts in terms of “how much effort do candidates expend by providing preferential access to” a range of benefits (see Kitschelt et al, 2009 ).…”

Niche parties in Latin America

“…We analyze different linkage strategies in order to understand which parties draw on which strategies. While the widespread use of clientelistic strategies among mainstream parties such as the Justicialist Party in Argentina is well-known (Auyero 2002;Freidenberg and Levitsky 2007;Weitz-Shapiro 2014), empirical evidence as to which parties use different linkages based on their place in party systems has been lacking. Our findings point to issue strategies as an important correlate of linkage strategies.…”