Cultural foundations of military diffusion

Goldman, Emily O.

doi:10.1017/s0260210506006930

Cited by 28 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Mechanisms of diffusion of military innovation received relatively less attention, but emulation-based theories brought this theme to the fore (Goldman, 2006;Wiesner, 2013). Sociological neoinstitutionalism underpins this view, which is broadly based on the idea that a state's armed forces adopt the institutions and behaviors of other states' armed forces because they believe that it is ''appropriate'' (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).…”

Section: Sources Of Change: Strategic Pressures Organizational Factomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This means that the quest for a socially defined legitimacy is essential in determining important organizational choices. Militaries thus adopt models (isomorphism) that they perceive as most prestigious, not necessarily the ones best suited to their specific needs (Goldman, 2006). Two forces often drive this process.…”

Section: Sources Of Change: Strategic Pressures Organizational Factomentioning

confidence: 99%

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Learning From Others? Emulation and Change in the Italian Armed Forces Since 2001

Coticchia

Moro

2016

Armed Forces & Society

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How does military change take place in states that are not able to develop autonomous solutions? How does transformation occur when limited resources are available? What are the ''sources of military change'' for armed forces that do not possess the (cognitive and material) resources that are essential for autonomous development?In articulating an answer to these questions, this article draws from the theoretical debate on interorganizational learning and looks at the mechanisms that drive ''learning from others.'' We argue that adaptation and organizational learning often had to look for, and then try and adapt, off-the-shelf solutions that required relatively more limited resources. Empirically, the article focuses on the Italian Armed Forces, which have rarely attracted scholarly attention, although it emerged from almost total lack of activity in the Cold War to extended deployments in the 2000s.

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Section: Sources Of Change: Strategic Pressures Organizational Factomentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Sources Of Change: Strategic Pressures Organizational Factomentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning From Others? Emulation and Change in the Italian Armed Forces Since 2001

Coticchia

Moro

2016

Armed Forces & Society

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“…The literature on institutional transfer is marked by a profound skepticism concerning the prospects for cross-cultural learning and mimicry. While modernizers like Peter the Great, Kemal Atatürk, and the architects of the Meiji Restoration have been portrayed as inveterate importers of western models and methods [Lewis 1961;Gerschenkron 1962;Dore 1973;Skocpol 1979;Westney 1982;Goldman 2006], they have simultaneously been dismissed as exceptions to a rule acknowledged by dozens of historians and social scientists. 1 "Countries are simply too 1 For instance, Theda Skocpol and Ellen Kay Trimberger noted that in the run-up to modernization neither Russia, Turkey, nor Japan "had been incorporated into a colonial empire" [Skocpol andTrimberger 1977-1978: 107].…”

Section: Intellectual Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobile Professionals and Metropolitan Models: The German Roots of Vocational Education in Latin America

Schrank¹

2020

Arch. eur. sociol.

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Abstract The Latin American model of vocational education has been widely portrayed as a homegrown success story, particularly by scholars and stakeholders who are aware of the region’s skill deficits, wary of alien solutions, and suspicious of institutional transfers more generally. Is the Latin American model really homegrown? I use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data to trace the model’s mores and methods not to the New World but to Central Europe and go on to identify three different transmission paths in the 20th century: imitation by Latin Americans of German origin, descent, and/or training in the run-up to World War II; propagation by West German attachés and advisors in an effort to rehabilitate their country’s image in the wake of the war; and adaptation by local employers and policymakers—who received additional support from Germany—at the turn of the last century. The results suggest that institutional importation is less a discrete event or outcome to be avoided than an ongoing process that, first, entails translation, adaptation, and at times obfuscation by importers as well as exporters; and, second, is facilitated by immigrants, their descendants, and diplomats in transnational contact zones.

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“…In that case, a decision not to reform appears rational in the short term, albeit leading to grave consequences in the longer perspective. Finally, there is a strand of literature where methods of warfare are viewed as culturally conditioned, so that "the degree to which a technological or organizational innovation is accepted and developed depends upon the cultural context" (for example , Parrott 2005;Goldman 2006;Tuck 2008).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

'Westernizations' from Peter I to Meiji: War, Political Competition, and Reform

Fedyukin

2016

SSRN Journal

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Radical "Westernizing" transformations in extra-European countries, from Peter I's Russia to Meiji Japan, are traditionally presented as a response to threats from the more militarily and technologically advanced European powers. This corresponds to the general tendency to view war as the driving force behind early modern state-building. Yet, how exactly did such transformations become possible? How were the rulers able to pursue policies that threaten large sections of their own military elites, from strel'tsy and mamluks to janissaries and samurais? And why did some of the extra-European states failed to 'Westernize" in response to external threats, while others rapidly Westernized when the threats was ephemeral, at best? This article seeks to complicate this "bellicist" narrative of Westernizing transformations by shifting the focus of analysis to the rulers' quest for political survival. It argues that when the domestic balance of power is stable, incumbent rulers tend not to embark on reform, even in the face of external military threats. Conversely, such reforms tend to occur when the domestic balance of power is disrupted to such a degree as to lead to the emergence of challengers, who launch "Westernization" as they seek to expand their power base and undermine that of their rivals. Factional political struggles accompanying such transformations are interpreted here not as a conservative reaction against reforms, but as a process that precedes and enables reforms by facilitating the creation of an alternative ruling coalition.

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Cultural foundations of military diffusion

Cited by 28 publications

References 8 publications

Learning From Others? Emulation and Change in the Italian Armed Forces Since 2001

Learning From Others? Emulation and Change in the Italian Armed Forces Since 2001

Mobile Professionals and Metropolitan Models: The German Roots of Vocational Education in Latin America

'Westernizations' from Peter I to Meiji: War, Political Competition, and Reform

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