Abstract:Cultural differences in reasoning and persuasion have mainly been documented for the East*West divide. Nisbett (2003) expects such differences to be absent for Western cultures because of their shared Grecian inheritance. The results of two experiments, however, show that France and The Netherlands, both Western European countries, differ with respect to the persuasiveness of different evidence types. In Study 1 (N0600), cultural differences occurred between the relative persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistica… Show more
“…This explanation found no support, as the scores on Need for Cognition (NFC) for French (M = 3.28, SD = 0.75) and Dutch (M = 3.13, SD = 0.75) participants did not significantly differ (t (216) = 0.02, p = .99). A cultural difference was found, though, on the preference for expert information: contrary to earlier findings (Hornikx and Hoeken 2007), the Dutch (M = 2.66, SD = 0.76) had a higher preference for expert information than the French (M = 2.40, SD = 0.87; t (216) = 2.69, p < .01). Preference for expert information was therefore not considered an alternative explanation for the cross-cultural difference in expertise judgments.…”
Section: Hypothesiscontrasting
confidence: 54%
“…When claims are highly improbable (e.g., "smoking reduces the risk of lung cancer"), people disbelieve such claims regardless of the support provided (see Edwards and Smith 1996). Eight claims were borrowed from Hornikx and Hoeken (2007). A pretest had shown these eight claims to be moderately probable.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The claims were related to different issues such as fear of driving cars, work productivity, and young criminals. For each claim, a relevant and an irrelevant discipline had been determined in a session with Dutch students (Hornikx and Hoeken 2007). Table 1 gives the eight claims in an English translation.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A second alternative explanation might be that the French participants appreciate information given by experts more than the Dutch participants. Therefore, participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale to four items of the Preference for Expert Information (PEI) scale from Hornikx and Hoeken (2007), which measures the degree to which people appreciate information given by experts (α = .81). The questionnaire ended with questions about participants' age, gender, nationality, and current education.…”
Teachers and researchers are considered epistemic authorities that provide reliable information if that information is relevant to their discipline. Students differentiate between relevant and irrelevant disciplines when assessing teachers' expertise. In this paper, it is investigated whether students' cultural-educational background plays a role in this differentiation between relevant and irrelevant disciplines. In large power distance cultures such as France, students learn to respect and obey their teacher, whereas in smaller power distance cultures such as the Netherlands, the relationships between students and teachers are more informal. Therefore, French students may be less sensitive to the actual discipline when assessing a source's expertise. In an experiment, it was empirically tested whether French students perceived smaller differences than Dutch students between fictitious professors and researchers who put forward information that was or was not related to their own discipline. Results showed that the French participants indeed differentiated to a much lesser degree between professors and researchers with a relevant and an irrelevant discipline than did the Dutch participants. Further analyses indicated that students' obedience partially mediated this effect of nationality on the difference between relevant and irrelevant disciplines. This study underlines the role that cultural-educational background can play in the assessments of epistemic authorities.
“…This explanation found no support, as the scores on Need for Cognition (NFC) for French (M = 3.28, SD = 0.75) and Dutch (M = 3.13, SD = 0.75) participants did not significantly differ (t (216) = 0.02, p = .99). A cultural difference was found, though, on the preference for expert information: contrary to earlier findings (Hornikx and Hoeken 2007), the Dutch (M = 2.66, SD = 0.76) had a higher preference for expert information than the French (M = 2.40, SD = 0.87; t (216) = 2.69, p < .01). Preference for expert information was therefore not considered an alternative explanation for the cross-cultural difference in expertise judgments.…”
Section: Hypothesiscontrasting
confidence: 54%
“…When claims are highly improbable (e.g., "smoking reduces the risk of lung cancer"), people disbelieve such claims regardless of the support provided (see Edwards and Smith 1996). Eight claims were borrowed from Hornikx and Hoeken (2007). A pretest had shown these eight claims to be moderately probable.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The claims were related to different issues such as fear of driving cars, work productivity, and young criminals. For each claim, a relevant and an irrelevant discipline had been determined in a session with Dutch students (Hornikx and Hoeken 2007). Table 1 gives the eight claims in an English translation.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A second alternative explanation might be that the French participants appreciate information given by experts more than the Dutch participants. Therefore, participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale to four items of the Preference for Expert Information (PEI) scale from Hornikx and Hoeken (2007), which measures the degree to which people appreciate information given by experts (α = .81). The questionnaire ended with questions about participants' age, gender, nationality, and current education.…”
Teachers and researchers are considered epistemic authorities that provide reliable information if that information is relevant to their discipline. Students differentiate between relevant and irrelevant disciplines when assessing teachers' expertise. In this paper, it is investigated whether students' cultural-educational background plays a role in this differentiation between relevant and irrelevant disciplines. In large power distance cultures such as France, students learn to respect and obey their teacher, whereas in smaller power distance cultures such as the Netherlands, the relationships between students and teachers are more informal. Therefore, French students may be less sensitive to the actual discipline when assessing a source's expertise. In an experiment, it was empirically tested whether French students perceived smaller differences than Dutch students between fictitious professors and researchers who put forward information that was or was not related to their own discipline. Results showed that the French participants indeed differentiated to a much lesser degree between professors and researchers with a relevant and an irrelevant discipline than did the Dutch participants. Further analyses indicated that students' obedience partially mediated this effect of nationality on the difference between relevant and irrelevant disciplines. This study underlines the role that cultural-educational background can play in the assessments of epistemic authorities.
“…In experimental studies, we found substantial support for this hypothesis: violation of the criteria trustworthiness (Hoeken et al 2012(Hoeken et al , 2014 and recency (Hoeken et al 2012) for argumentation from authority, relevant similarities and irrelevant dissimilarities for argumentation from analogy (Hoeken and Hustinx 2009;Hoeken et al 2012), number of examples (Hoeken and Hustinx 2009;Hoeken et al 2014;Hornikx and Hoeken 2007) and relevance of example for argumentation from example (Hoeken et al 2014), cause sufficiency and cause relevance for argumentation from cause to effect (Hoeken et al 2014) and desirability of effect (Hoeken et al 2012) for argumentation from consequence resulted in a significantly lower claim acceptability. Only violation of the criteria expertise (for argumentation from authority) and effectivity (for argumentation from consequence) did not always reveal the effect predicted (Hoeken et al 2012(Hoeken et al , 2014, possibly as a result of too subtle manipulations.…”
Can argumentation schemes play a part in the critical processing of argumentation by lay people? In a qualitative study, participants were invited to come up with strong and weak arguments for a given claim and were subsequently interviewed for why they thought the strong argument was stronger than the weak one. Next, they were presented with a list of arguments and asked to rank these arguments from strongest to weakest, upon which they were asked to motivate their judgments in an interview. In order to assess whether lay people apply argument scheme specific criteria when performing these tasks, five different argumentation schemes were included in this study: argumentation from authority, from example, from analogy, from cause to effect, and from consequences. Laypeople's use of criteria for argument quality was inferred from interview protocols. The results revealed that participants combined general criteria from informal logic (such as
123Argumentation ( 2017 ) 31:681-703 DOI 10.1007 relevance and acceptability) and scheme-specific criteria (such as expertise for argumentation from authority, similarity for argumentation from analogy, effectiveness for argumentation from consequences). The results supported the conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical argument scheme rule in a strong sense and provided a more fine-grained view of central processing in the Elaboration Likelihood Model.
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