Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency

Biringer, Betty E.; Vugrin, Eric D.; Warren, Drake E.

doi:10.1201/b14566

Cited by 83 publications

(67 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…In Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) the shifts towards resilience acknowledges that all hazards cannot be avoided or deflected, and therefore, infrastructures must be able to absorb some unexpected perturbations without losing functionality (Biringer, Vugrin, & Warren, : 75; Dahlberg, ; Dahlberg, Johannesen‐Henry, Raju, & Tulsiani, ). A resilience approach, in other words, shifts the focus in preparedness planning from a traditional top‐down perspective, where authorities assume responsibility for managing the effects of a disruption, to bottom‐up thinking that builds on existing capabilities of the citizens involved.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In socio‐technological systems, adaptive capacity can be said to exist through “institutions and networks that learn and store knowledge and experience and create flexibility in problem solving” (Resilience Alliance, n.d.), while a recent definition in relation to critical infrastructure reads: “ Adaptive capacity is the degree to which the system is capable of self‐organization and uses nonstandard operating practices in an attempt to overcome disruption impacts” (Biringer et al., : 119). To be adaptive can also be defined as is the capacity to adjust to changing circumstances by developing new plans, taking new actions, or modifying behaviours (Rodin, : 9–42).…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do you have a Plan B?

Dahlberg

2017

Contingencies & Crisis Mgmt

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This study explores adaptive capacities in infrastructure preparedness planning from a resilience approach using the bridge between Denmark and Sweden as a case. First, a theoretical framework anchors adaptive capacity in a more general resilience discourse focusing on flexibility and adaptive capacity with emphasis on citizens' ability to interpret information and adjust their behaviour without prior planning and training or instructions. Then, findings from a small qualitative study (n = 45) of the perception of commuters and travellers of the responsibilities and contingencies involved in potential long‐term disruptions of the Øresund Bridge are discussed. The most important suggested recommendation for authorities and infrastructure owners is simply to remind users that an infrastructure is not a given—in other words, to ask travellers whether “they have a Plan B,” thereby prompting citizens to contemplate their dependency on infrastructure and prepare for a disruption.

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Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do you have a Plan B?

Dahlberg

2017

Contingencies & Crisis Mgmt

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“…As a result of the increasing need of our society to have proactive responses to natural disasters, assessing and managing hazard risks to civil infrastructures and methods to incorporate hazards into existing IMSs have become a high-profile matter in the agenda of infrastructure managers (Biringer, Vugrin, & Warren, 2013;Taylor, Werner, & Graf, 2006;Thompson, Rogers, & Thomas, 2012). Significant works have been archived, especially in the application of probabilistic methods to model the occurrences of hazard events and the expected impacts incurred (Castelli & Scavia, 2008;Faber & Stewart, 2003;Korup & Clague, 2009;Schubert et al 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Optimal intervention strategies for multiple objects affected by manifest and latent deterioration processes

Lethanh¹,

Adey²,

Fernando

2014

Structure and Infrastructure Engineering

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In the existing infrastructure management systems, optimal interventions strategies (OISs) are determined for objects that deteriorate gradually (manifest deterioration process, MDPs), under the assumption that with appropriate inspection and intervention strategies the probability of failure of object can be neglected. Objects that deteriorate suddenly (latent deterioration process, LDPs), for example, due to scouring during a flood or earth movements during an earthquake are not considered. The determination of OISs for an object that deteriorates due to both MDPs and LDPs requires the consideration of both. The latter, however, means that the probability of failure of the object must be considered. In this article, a Markov model is presented that can be used to determine OISs for multiple objects of multiple types affected by uncorrelated MDPs and LDPs. The model is an extension of the model proposed by Mayet and Madanat (Incorporation of seismic considerations in bridge management systems. Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering, 17:185 -193, 2002). In the model, a set of condition states (CSs) is used to describe the condition of objects of each type, where each set is composed of nonfailure CSs and failure CSs. The probabilities of going from each non-failure CS to each failure CS are estimated using normalised fragility curves, and the probabilities of going from each non-failure CS to each non-failure CS are initially estimated using the Markov deterioration prediction model of Kobayashi, Kaito, and Lethanh (A Bayesian estimation method to improve deterioration prediction for infrastructure system with Markov chain model. International Journal of Architecture, Engineering and Construction, 1:1 -13, 2012a) and later adjusted taking into consideration the probabilities of entering the failure CSs. The use of the model is demonstrated using a road link comprising one road section and one bridge.

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“…The everlasting conditions of the changes in the scope and intensity of threats to stable development of the industry till pose a true problem that hinders search for the ways of ensuring security of the fuel and energy complex facilities (Gheorghe et al, 2006;Biringer et al, 2013;Flammini, 2012;Lewis, 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%