2011
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1344302
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Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value

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Cited by 211 publications
(431 citation statements)
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References 21 publications
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“…Putra dan Herawati (2013) menyatakan bahwa secara simultan profitabilitas, struktur modal, ukuran perusahaan, dan likuiditas berpengaruh terhadap nilai perusahaan. Rasio keuangan seperti ROA, leverage, maupun current ratio selalu digunakan sebagai variabel kontrol penelitian terdahulu karena kemampuan rasio tersebut dalam memprediksi nilai perusahaan (Ammann et al, 2011;Jo dan Harjoto, 2011;Nini et al, 2012). Oleh sebab itu, peran kinerja keuangan dalam penciptaan nilai perusahaan tidak bisa dinihilkan.…”
Section: Pendahuluanunclassified
“…Putra dan Herawati (2013) menyatakan bahwa secara simultan profitabilitas, struktur modal, ukuran perusahaan, dan likuiditas berpengaruh terhadap nilai perusahaan. Rasio keuangan seperti ROA, leverage, maupun current ratio selalu digunakan sebagai variabel kontrol penelitian terdahulu karena kemampuan rasio tersebut dalam memprediksi nilai perusahaan (Ammann et al, 2011;Jo dan Harjoto, 2011;Nini et al, 2012). Oleh sebab itu, peran kinerja keuangan dalam penciptaan nilai perusahaan tidak bisa dinihilkan.…”
Section: Pendahuluanunclassified
“…They provide evidence that lenders' threat of accelerating debt payments affects firms' investment decisions, resulting in a net reduction in investment following the technical violation. Nini, Sufi, and Smith (2009) examine changes in firms' corporate governance after covenant violations. They find that covenant violations are often followed by an increase in CEO turnover, the hiring of turnaround specialists, and a reduction in shareholder payouts.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Here the core driver is that companies with no-debt have systematically lower governance than all other companies (Aldamen and Duncan, 2012). Nini et al (2012) provided evidence that creditors play an active role in the governance of corporations. They showed that violations of financial covenants are followed immediately by a decline in acquisitions and capital expenditures, a sharp reduction in leverage and shareholder payouts, and an increase in CEO turnover.…”
Section: Debtmentioning
confidence: 99%