Credibility and class in the evolution of public banks: the case of Turkey

Marois, Thomas; Güngen, Ali Rıza

doi:10.1080/03066150.2016.1176023

Cited by 31 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 51 publications

(43 reference statements)

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“…It was the duty loss (görev zararı) mechanism that institutionalized and made all these SOE supports to private industrialists possible. Duty losses are mandated financial losses officially assigned to SOEs that should be compensated for by government transfers (Marois & Güngen, 2016, p. 11). For example, if a SOE product was sold to industrialists below the cost of production, the difference was considered as a duty loss and was paid by the government to the SOE budget (Kepenek, 1990, p. 126).…”

Section: Duty Losses Class Compromise and Soes: 1960‐1980mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Development of the State‐Owned Enterprises in Turkey: 1923–1980

Zaifer¹

2021

J Historical Sociology

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This article seeks to re‐interpret the development of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in Turkey from 1923 to 1980. The article shows that the dominant strong state tradition (SST) literature, which interpreted the development of SOEs as an independent project of the state to maintain its control over society, had been unable to fully explain the development processes of SOEs because it treated the state as an external entity distinct from (and even opposing to) the social classes. Employing an alternative Poulantzian framework, the article argues that the development of SOEs in Turkey was driven by class‐industry interest and appeared as a precondition of the development of capitalism in Turkey. As such, relations between SOEs and the social classes were internal and complementary, rather than external and antagonistic. The SOEs were providing the bulk of industrial inputs and investment capital to the bourgeoisie fractions within the constitutive context of domestic capital accumulation strategies at the time (e.g. capitalist consolidation in 1930s, capitalist expansion in 1950s, capitalist expansion with duty losses in 1960s and 1970s). The SOEs were also benefiting the laboring and popular classes in terms of employment opportunities and higher wages.

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Section: Duty Losses Class Compromise and Soes: 1960‐1980mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Development of the State‐Owned Enterprises in Turkey: 1923–1980

Zaifer¹

2021

J Historical Sociology

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“…It was the duty loss ( görev zararı ) mechanism that institutionalised and made these state supports to private industrialists possible. Duty losses are mandated financial losses officially assigned to SOEs that should be compensated for by government transfers (Marois and Güngen, 2016: 11). For example, if a SOE product was sold to industrialists below the cost of production, the difference was considered as a duty loss and was paid by the government to the SOE budget.…”

Section: Concrete Case Study: Turkey’s Privatisation Process In the 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

Variegated Privatisation: Class, Capital Accumulation and State in Turkey’s Privatisation Process in the 1980s and 1990s

Zaifer

2018

Critical Sociology

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This article seeks to illustrate a problematic aspect of dominant-contemporary Marxian literature on privatisation: an overgeneralised explanation that shifting structural imperatives of contemporary capitalism, global powers and international financial institutions externally imposed privatisation downwards on all national-domestic political spaces. I suggest an alternative approach that emphasises the complex interplay of three internal factors – class agency, capital accumulation strategies, and state institutions – in mediating and shaping external pressures towards privatisation. Through a study of the Turkish privatisation process in the 1980s and 1990s, I illustrate that even though privatisation was thrust on Turkey by the structural dynamics, the World Bank, the IMF and global capital, its implementation has been contested inside and outside of the state apparatus by the Turkish power bloc (i.e. fractions of capital) within the constitutive context of the prevailing strategies of the domestic capital accumulation regime of Turkey at the time.

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“…It was the duty loss (görev zararı) mechanism that institutionalized and made these state supports to private industrialists possible. Duty losses are mandated financial losses officially assigned to SOEs that should be compensated for by government transfers (Marois and Güngen 2016: 11). For example, if an SOE product was sold to the industrialists below the cost of production, the difference was considered as a duty loss and was paid by the government to the SOE budget.…”

Section: The Privatization In Turkeymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Acceleration of Privatization: Understanding State, Power Bloc, and Capital Accumulation in Turkey

Zaifer

2018

Review of Radical Political Economics

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This article seeks to explain the post-2001 acceleration of privatization in Turkey. Employing a Marxian analytical framework, the article argues that the acceleration of privatization in Turkey in the post-2001 period was the result of a powerful combination of support from the power bloc (i.e., fractions of capital) in Turkey, which has been achieved with a major subordination of labor. The power bloc saw previously unavailable advantages in supporting privatization within the context of the post-2001 domestic capital accumulation regime, and therefore acted to restructure the legal and institutional framework of the state to weaken the resistance of labor and facilitate the participation of potential investors in privatization tenders. This interpretation challenges the dominance of institutionalist accounts, which draw on the legal-institutional framework and/or national interest-based discourses without considering how the changing relations among different fractions of capital and between capital and labor within the constitutive dynamics of domestic capital accumulation exerted significant influence on the acceleration of privatization. JEL Classification: P160; F50

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Credibility and class in the evolution of public banks: the case of Turkey

Cited by 31 publications

References 51 publications

The Development of the State‐Owned Enterprises in Turkey: 1923–1980

The Development of the State‐Owned Enterprises in Turkey: 1923–1980

Variegated Privatisation: Class, Capital Accumulation and State in Turkey’s Privatisation Process in the 1980s and 1990s

The Acceleration of Privatization: Understanding State, Power Bloc, and Capital Accumulation in Turkey

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