Creating the Appearance of Consensus in Mende Political Discourse

Murphy, William P.

doi:10.1525/aa.1990.92.1.02a00020

Cited by 54 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 38 publications

(5 reference statements)

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“…Consistent with this pattern, paramount chiefs facing limited competition do indeed act despotically, but they are able to do so in part because they use non-governmental organizations as 7 One possible argument would be that civil society may endogenously become stronger as a barrier against the despotic power of chiefs in places with a few ruling families but despotic chiefs still stifle economic development despite this stronger civil society. This argument, however, is consistent neither with the evidence that, when there are only a few ruling families, attitudes towards chiefs are more favorable nor with the anthropological evidence presented below, for example, and Murphy (1990) and Ferme (2001). a way of building and mobilizing support.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 54%

“…While it is possible that some of these activities are in the collective good, many of them may simply be in the private interest of the chiefs and their families. This point is made explicitly in the anthropological literature on Sierra Leone, in particular by Murphy (1990) and also by Ferme (2001). Murphy emphasizes that in Sierra Leone community meetings-the outcome in column 1 of Table 10 Other outcomes can be interpreted in the same way.…”

Section: Bridging and Bonding Social Capital And Collective Actionmentioning

confidence: 94%

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Chiefs: Elite Control of Civil Society and Economic Development in Sierra Leone

Acemoğlu

Reed

Robinson

2013

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The lowest level of government in sub-Saharan Africa is often a cadre of chiefs who raise taxes, control the judicial system and allocate the most important scarce resource -land. Chiefs, empowered by colonial indirect rule, are often accused of using their power despotically and inhibiting rural development. Yet others view them as traditional representatives of rural people, and survey evidence suggests that they maintain widespread support. We use the colonial history of Sierra Leone to investigate the relationships between chiefs' power on economic development, peoples' attitudes and social capital. There, a chief must come from one of the ruling families recognized by British colonial authorities. Chiefs face less competition and fewer political constraints in chiefdoms with fewer ruling families. We show that places with fewer ruling families have significantly worse development outcomes today -in particular, lower rates of educational attainment, child health, and non-agricultural employment. But the institutions of chiefs' authority are also highly respected among villagers, and their chiefdoms have higher levels of "social capital," for example, greater popular participation in a variety of "civil society" organizations and forums that might be used to hold chiefs accountable. We argue that these results are difficult to reconcile with the standard principle-agent approach to politics and instead reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs. Rather than acting as a vehicle for disciplining chiefs, these organizations have been structured by chiefs to control society.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 54%

Section: Bridging and Bonding Social Capital And Collective Actionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Chiefs: Elite Control of Civil Society and Economic Development in Sierra Leone

Acemoğlu

Reed

Robinson

2013

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“…Scholars have argued that norms of social interaction are an outcome of long-run evolutionary mechanisms (Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 2004); have deep historical roots in critical junctures that reshape social relations, such as the extraction of slaves from Africa (Nathan Nunn 2008); or reflect relatively fixed characteristics of communities, such as ethnic heterogeneity or the distribution of wealth (Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara 2005). Moreover, aid workers often return from the field demoralized by an impression that the benefits of foreign aid projects are easily captured by existing power brokers, a view that resonates with findings by economists (Mary Kay Gugerty and Michael Kremer 1998) and anthropologists (William Murphy 1990 andJean Ensminger 2007). …”

Section: Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao 2004)mentioning

confidence: 94%

Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia

Fearon

Humphreys

Weinstein

2009

American Economic Review

242

160

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“…In accordance with the frontstage/backstage duality highlighted in conflict studies (Murphy, 1990;Breusers et al, 1998), the outbreak of conflict at one site can be linked to the reaching of consensus at another, or vice versa. Such dynamics often occur in relation to new arenas created as a result of development or conservation intervention.…”

Section: Conflict Property and Control Over Natural Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 57%

Property Relations by other Means: Conflict over Dryland Resources in Benin and Mali

Meur

Hochet

2010

Eur J Dev Res

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Conflicts over natural resources and property concern the distribution of entitlements to resources and social identities. The highlighting of this continuity enables the insertion of conflict into a broader historical and theoretical framework dealing with social change, as well as access to and control over resources. However, this reveals nothing about the discontinuity between tensions over natural resources and outbreaks of conflict involving physical and symbolic violence. Case studies carried out in Mali and Benin provide an empirical basis for the discussion of the following set of exploratory hypotheses: they stress the continuity between conflict and property within the frame of a theory of access to natural resources; they emphasise the plurality of actors involved in disputes over natural resources in African drylands beyond the farmer-herdsman configuration; and they see resource conflict, property and policy as a matter of persuasion, that is, representation and narrative.Les conflits sur les ressources naturelles et la proprie´te´concernent la distribution des droits sur les ressources et la de´finition des identite´s sociales. Mettre l'accent sur cette continuite´permet d'inse´rer le conflit dans un cadre historique et the´orique plus large touchant au changement social et a`l'acce`s et au controˆle des ressources naturelles. Toutefois, cela ne dit rien de la discontinuite´entre tensions sur les ressources et de´clenchement de conflits impliquant une violence physique et symbolique. Des e´tudes de cas au Mali et Be´nin fournissent la base de discussion d'hypothe`ses mettant l'accent sur la continuite´entre conflit et proprie´te´dans le cadre d'une the´orie de l'acce`s aux ressources naturelles ; montrant la pluralite´des acteurs implique´s dans les disputes sur les ressources naturelles en Afrique se`che au-dela`de la polarite´agriculteur-e´leveur ; concevant les conflits, proprie´te´s et politiques des ressources naturelles comme une affaire de persuasion, donc de repre´sentation et de re´cit.

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Creating the Appearance of Consensus in Mende Political Discourse

Cited by 54 publications

References 38 publications

Chiefs: Elite Control of Civil Society and Economic Development in Sierra Leone

Chiefs: Elite Control of Civil Society and Economic Development in Sierra Leone

Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia

Property Relations by other Means: Conflict over Dryland Resources in Benin and Mali

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