COVID-19 and Populism: A Sui Generis Crisis

Abstract

It is widely believed that populists benefit from crisis situations. This chapter discusses the literature on crises and populism from a theoretical perspective and provides a novel framework of analysis for addressing the study of the COVID-19 crisis in the light of its (de)politicization. This framework allows the study of the politicization of the COVID-19 issue by populists looking at the divide between the political and the non-political status of the issue, disputes about different stakes and their relative priority in managing the crisis, and issue-specific and policy-related contentions about COVID-19. The general research question is whether populists in Europe used the COVID-19 issue to gain centrality in the political field and/or to push forward new opposition lines. A further related question is to pinpoint whether populists reacted in a similar way across countries or whether they adapted their response according to their institutional role.

The Impact of COVID-19 on the Support for the German AfD: Jumping the Populist Ship or Staying the Course?

“…While other studies have already looked at the performance of populist parties in the pandemic (see e.g., Bobba and Hubé 2021 ; Wondreys and Mudde 2020 ), we identify a lack of research that looks in detail at voter preferences and the internal division of populist parties when it comes to cross-cutting issues outside their core ideology. We address this research gap by not only providing a theoretical answer to the lack of success of the AfD in the crisis, but also by embedding these considerations into a broader empirical analysis over the course of the pandemic with a rigorous identification strategy.…”

“…The second strand of research that we base this paper on focuses particularly on populism and the COVID-19 crisis and argues that the COVID-19 crisis differs from economic or migration crises in that it does not fit into the common problem-solving schemes of the latter crisis, through which populist parties have grown and/or played an active role (Bobba and Hubé 2021 ; Ruhose 2020 ). An exogenous crisis, i.e., one that is not determined by factors within the political system (such as natural disasters), is harder to politicize “since causal attribution of responsibility is not always possible” (Bobba and Hubé 2021 , 7). What populist parties then try to do is to move the problem into the realm of human intention in order to follow the populist electoral strategy and blame ‘the elite’ for the crisis (ibid.).…”

“…After initially struggling to find a position that was also in congruence with the preference of its voters the party quickly returned to fundamental opposition (Ruhose 2020 ). Generally, populist parties have reacted ambivalently to the pandemic, which they have not been able to exploit for their own benefit in the initial phase, e.g., in the form of greater support (see Bobba and Hubé 2021 ; Wondreys and Mudde 2020 ). 1…”

“…A pandemic event that threatens not only many people’s health but also their very existence is a phenomenon that, in contrast to Mueller’s list, lies outside the sphere of political influence. In the same way as the crisis effects the supply side of populist politics, in that the government cannot be blamed for the emergence of the crisis (Bobba and Hubé 2021 ), the exogenous and live threatening nature of crisis is also likely to affect the demand side.…”

“… 1 For the necessary distinction between (co)governing populist parties and those in opposition, see Bobba and Hubé ( 2021 ). …”