Covert Operations, Wars, Detainee Destinations, and the Psychology of Democratic Peace

Crandall, Christian S.; Cox, Owen; Beasley, Ryan K.; Omelicheva, Mariya Y.

doi:10.1177/0022002716669572

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 58 publications

(78 reference statements)

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“…This is a noteworthy result since the inclusion of the interaction term changes the interpretation of the divided government 62. See Crandall et al 2018;Forsythe 1992;Rosato 2003;Russett 1994. 63.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secret but Constrained: The Impact of Elite Opposition on Covert Operations

Smith¹

2019

Int Org

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Recent international relations scholarship has argued that political elites constrain the use of military force by democracies. Despite the persuasiveness of this research, scholars have largely ignored elite dynamics’ ability to constrain the initiation of covert operations. This omission is consequential because scholars of US foreign policy often assume that covert operations serve as a substitute for the overt use of force; secrecy allows leaders to limit information to congressional elites and thus weaken their oversight capabilities. Do elite political dynamics constrain presidents’ ability to act secretly or do they affect the overt use of force only? I argue that elite political constraints—particularly opposition from Congress—extend to the president's ability to initiate covert operations. By examining the trade-off between US military force and CIA-initiated covert operations during the Cold War, I find the likelihood that covert operations are initiated decreases significantly during periods of divided government and that there is no distinguishable trade-off between covert operations and overt military force. The results suggest that constraints on covert operations became more uniform across unified and divided government following congressional oversight reforms in 1975 that reduced the information asymmetry between the majority and minority party. These findings have important ramifications for the nascent literature on back-door bargaining and covert signalling. Because democratic leaders frequently face domestic political costs even when acting in secret, covert operations should allow leaders to credibly convey their resolve.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secret but Constrained: The Impact of Elite Opposition on Covert Operations

Smith¹

2019

Int Org

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“…6Only Study 2 of Crandall et al (2016) qualifies as a within-subjects design. 7Chaudoin and Woon (2018)'s 4 "sessions" with the combination of BN-BF and CN-CF treatments in Part 1 and Part 2 are a multiple-module, within-subject design with 2 factors varied within-subject independently-the presence of feedback (or lack thereof) and the high/low valuations.…”

Section: Within-subjects Designs' Advantagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When employing within-subjects designs, IR scholars can use several tactics to mitigate the order e ects: to combine them with between-subjects assignments of other factors (e.g. Bush and Prather, 2021;Crandall et al, 2016;Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, 2021;Renshon, Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer, 2022;Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer and Renshon, 2018); to complement a within-subjects experiment with a separate between-subjects experiment for the same factor (e.g. (Naoi, Shi and Zhu, 2022;Son and Park, 2022)); or to randomize or counterbalance the order of within-subjects treatments (e.g.…”

Section: Within-subjects Designs' Disadvantagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking the Tradeoffs of Within-Subjects Designs in International Relations Experiments

Suong,

Desposato,

Gartzke

2024

Preprint

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All experimentalists in International Relations face a choice over their designs—including that between between-subjects and within-subjects designs. This manuscript helps them make informed decisions in two ways. First, we reassess existing findings on the advantages of within-subjects designs, such as higher statistical power and precision in treatment effect estimates. Second, we contextualize the tradeoffs of within-subjects designs by examining their external validity across countries. Our results are based on a unique survey experiment with within-subjects and between-subjects designs in Brazil, China, Japan, and Sweden and a meta-analysis of 26 paired within-subjects conditions from existing lab experiments. We find that within-subjects designs provide higher statistical power, precision in treatment effect estimates, insights on treatment effect heterogeneity, and strong external validity across countries. However, we find evidence of order effects in within-subjects experiments. Our results imply that within-subjects designs are a practical option in International Relations—particularly for under-resourced researchers—albeit with tradeoffs.

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“…As a result, states may rely on it to obscure aspects of their foreign policy that would damage their reputations domestically or abroad (Joseph and Poznansky 2018). For example, democracies may use covert action against other democracies to avoid domestic backlash for violating the expectation that they remain on good terms with democratic governments (Crandall et al 2018). 2 Relatedly, governments may delegate violence against civilians to non-state actors to obscure their involvement from international audiences who would respond negatively to human rights violations (Carey et al 2015).…”

Section: Secrecy Delegation and Conflict Escalationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Proxies Provide Plausible Deniability? Evidence From Experiments on Three Surveys

Williamson

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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A purported advantage of secrecy in international politics is its ability to reduce pressures for conflict escalation by obscuring responsibility for hostile actions. Delegating these actions to proxies is one strategy states use to retain plausible deniability and limit escalation risks. Yet, proxies often have strong ties to sponsoring states, raising questions about their ability to influence blame and demands for retaliation. This paper tests these effects by analyzing American responses to hypothetical attacks by Chinese, Russian, and Iranian actors through experiments administered on three surveys. The results show that using proxies for these attacks modestly reduced how much Americans blamed the respective foreign governments, while also limiting demands that their senior leadership be sanctioned. However, the use of proxies did not affect Americans’ attitudes toward more forceful responses by the US government. These findings contribute to understanding of how proxies shape plausible deniability and escalation risks in international conflicts.

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Covert Operations, Wars, Detainee Destinations, and the Psychology of Democratic Peace

Cited by 4 publications

References 58 publications

Secret but Constrained: The Impact of Elite Opposition on Covert Operations

Secret but Constrained: The Impact of Elite Opposition on Covert Operations

Rethinking the Tradeoffs of Within-Subjects Designs in International Relations Experiments

Do Proxies Provide Plausible Deniability? Evidence From Experiments on Three Surveys

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